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PRINCIPLES OF MARYLAND PROCUREMENT LAW
Scott A. Livingstont
Lydia B. Hoovertt

I.

INTRODUCTION

The State of Maryland, consistent with other states, buys goods
and services to implement major government programs.' The State

t B.A., Clark University, 1972; J.D., Antioch School of Law, 1975; Assistant Attorney General of Maryland, 1976-83; Partner, Rifkin, Livingston, Levitan &
Silver, LLC.
tt B.A., The Johns Hopkins University, 1995; J.D., William & Mary School of
Law, 1998; Associate, Rifkin, Livingston, Levitan & Silver, LLC.
1.
See Act of May 27, 1980, ch. 775, 1980 Md. Laws 2650 (originally codified at
MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, §§ 1-101 to 9-218 (1981), now codified at MD. CODE
ANN .. STATE FIN. & PROC. (1995 & Supp. 1999». The 49 other states and the
District of Columbia have codified their own procurement articles. See ALA.
CODE §§ 41-16-1 to -144 (1991 & Supp. 1999); ALAsKA STAT. §§ 36.05.010 to
.95.010 (Michie 1998 & Supp. 1999); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-2501 to -2662
(West 1999); ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 19-11-101 to -806, 22-9-101 to -702 (Michie
1998 & Supp. 1999); CAL. PUB. CaNT. CODE §§ 100 to 22355 (West 1985 &
Supp. 2000); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-101-101 to -112-101 (West 1990 &
Supp. 1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 4A-50 to -80, 4b-91 to -102 (West 1998
& Supp. 1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §§ 6901-6986 (1997 & Supp. 1998);
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-1101 to -1177.7, 1-1181.1 to -1191.4 (1999); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 287.001 to .1345 (West 1999 & Supp. 2000); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 13-10-1,
36-10-1 to -5,50-5-50 to -124,50-5-130 to -133 (1998 & Supp. 1999); HAw. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 103D-101 to -1304 (Michie 1999); IDAHO CODE §§ 54-1901 to 1930, 67-5710 to -5778 (1994 & Supp. 1999); 30 ILL. CaMP. STAT. ANN. 500/1-1
to 99-5 (West 1999); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 4-13.4-1-1 to .4-10-7, 5-22-1-1 to -22-12
(Michie 1997 & Supp. 1999); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 18.1 to .63, 72.1 to 73A.21
(West 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-3737a to -3744 (1999); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 45A005 to .485 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 2000); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:1551
to :1736 (West 1989 & Supp. 1999); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 155, §§ 1811 to
1825-1 (West 1989 & Supp. 1999); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 30B, §§ 1 to 19
(West 1992 & Supp. 1999); MICH. CaMP. LAws ANN. §§ 18.1237 to .1295 (West
1994 & Supp. 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 16C.02 to .25 (West 1997 & Supp.
2000); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 31-1-1 to -11-31 (1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 34.010 to
.359 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 18-4-121 to -407 (1999);
NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 73-101 to -401 (Michie 1996); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. §§
333.010 to .500, 338.140 to .147 (Michie 1999); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-1:121 to :72, 228:1 to :5a, 237:44 (1999); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:32-1 to :36-4 (West
1996 & Supp. 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1-21 to -199 (Michie 1989 & Supp.
1999); NY GEN. MUN. LAw §§ 100 to 109-b (McKinney 1999 & Supp. 2000);
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Finance and Procurement Article of the Maryland Code ("Procurement Article")2 and its regulations 3 govern the award of state contracts for the purchase of goods and services. There is a tensioneasy to feel but difficult to define-between the points where written procurement laws yield to unwritten actual practices, where
rules for contract award seem more mercurial than stable, and
where the contractor's cost expectations oppose the procurement
officer's zeal for greater value. Among these points lay the practical
principles of procurement law.
The modern era of Maryland procurement law began in 1976
with the State's waiver of sovereign immunity as a defense to contract actions,4 and continued with the enactment of the Procurement Article. s The Maryland General Assembly codified broad rules
to establish a uniform system for the purchase of goods and services
by state agencies. The Procurement Article has subsequently given
rise to approximately 400 pages of procurement regulations. 6 The
application of these regulations to actual procurement disputes, including bid protests and claims arising under procurement contracts, has given rise to approximately 1200 appeals docketed with
the Maryland State Board of Contract Appeals (MSBCA) since its
creation in 1980. 7
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-48-60, 143-128 to -135.9 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 44to -02, 54-44.4-01 to .4-09 (1989 & Supp. 1999); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§
125.07 to .111 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999); OKlA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, §§ 101 to
138 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 279.005 to .990 (1999); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 62, §§ 101 to 4509 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999); RI. GEN. LAws §§
37-2-1 to -76.1 (1997 & Supp. 1999); S.c. CODE ANN. §§ 11-35-10 to -5270 (Law.
Co-op. 1986 & Supp. 1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAws §§ 5-18-1 to -23-49 (Michie
1994 & Supp. 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 12-4-101 to -802 (1999); TEX. GoV'T
CODE ANN. §§ 2151.001 to 2177.003 (West 2000); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-56-1
to -73 (1997 & Supp. 1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4001-09, tit. 32, § 3113
(1994 & Supp. 1999); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-35 to -80 (Michie 1999 & Supp.
1999); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 39.04.010 to .96.903 (West 1991 & Supp.
1999); W. VA. CODE §§ 5-6-7; 5A-3-1 to -55A (1993 & Supp. 1999); WIS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 16.70 to .847, 62.15 (West 1996 & Supp. 1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 166-101 to -805 (Michie 1999).
See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §§ 11-101 to 17-402.
See Code of Maryland Regulations (COMAR) 21.01.01 to .14.07 (1999).
See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GoV'T § 12-201(a) (1999) ("[TJhe State, its officers,
and its units may not raise the defense of sovereign immunity in a contract
action ... ").
See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC §§ 11-101 to 17-402.
See COMAR 21.01.01 to .14.07.
In 1981, the Maryland Department of Transportation Board of Contract Ap0~1

2.
3.
4.

5.
6.
7.
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Judicial decisions,s Opinions of the Attorney General of Maryland, and Advisory Opinions of the Maryland State Ethics Commission provide most of the remaining written legal sources prescribing
how and to whom contracts are awarded. The Board of Public
Works (BPW),9 which has legal authority to control procurement,
furnishes a source of procurement "realpolitik," if not law. Instead
of the fiction that Maryland procurement law consists solely of the
application of known rules to visible facts, vendors and their counsel confront a rougher source of law: a fine blend of rules and written and unwritten practices of law and lore, mixed in with notions
of fair play and political mischief.
The tensions in the community of interests involved in state
procurement are reflected in the award of contracts. A contract
with the State implicates the community of taxpayers and its representatives, procurement officers and their using agencies, and the
MSBCA members and the judges who review MSBCA decisions
under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). \0 To borrow a
phrase from Justice Holmes, there is some play between the joints
of the procurement machinery. I I There is a fair measure of roughness among the parties involved, each pursuing its own, sometimes

8.

9.

10.
11.

peals became the Maryland State Board of Contract Appeals (MSBCA), with
jurisdiction to hear bid protests as well as contract claims. See Scott A. Livingston, Fair Treatment For Contradors Doing Business with the State of Maryland, 15
U. BALT. L. REv. 215, 215-16 (1986).
For judicial decisions interpreting the State Finance and Procurement Article
since 1986, see Chesapeake Charter, Inc. v. Anne Arundel Co. Bd. of Ed., 358
Md. 129, 747 A.2d 625 (2000); SHA v. David A. Bramble, Inc., 351 Md. 226,
717 A.2d 943 (1998); Philip Morris Inc. v. Glendening, 349 Md. 660, 1230 A.2d
709 (1998); The Driggs Corp. v. Maryland Aviation Admin., 348 Md. 389, 704
A.2d 433 (1998); University of Md. v. MFE Inc./NCP Architects, Inc., 345 Md.
86, 691 A.2d 676 (1997); ARA Health Servs., Inc. v. Department of Public
Safety and Correctional Svs., 344 Md. 85, 685 A.2d 485 (1996); Maryland State
Police v. Warwick Supply & Equip. Co., 330 Md. 474, 624 A.2d 1238 (1993);
Department of Gen. Servs. v. Harmans Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 98 Md. App.
535, 624 A.2d 1238 (1993); McLean Contracting Co. v. Maryland Transp.
Auth., 70 Md. App. 514, 527 A.2d 51 (1987).
For the creation and powers of the Board of Public Works (BPW), see CONST.
OF MD., DECL. RTS., art. XII, §§ 1-3; MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §§ 12101 to -109 (1995 & Supp. 1999); COMAR 21.02.01.01 to .08.
See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §§ 12-101, -105.
See Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499, 501 (1931) ("[TJhe interpretation
of constitutional principles must not be read too literal. We must remember
that the machinery of government would not work if it were not allowed a little play in its joints.").
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enlightened, self-interest. The result is an evolving set of standards,
sometimes clear and other times opaque, which generally leads to
the award of contracts to the proper party. This, in turn, mostly inures to the benefit of the public.
The enactment of the Procurement Article solidified the modern procurement era, but its emergence began a few years earlier.I2
The scandalous resignation of Governor and later Vice President
Spiro Agnew in 1973-a direct consequence of his nefarious practices in Maryland procurement-prompted the enactment of a version of the ABA Model Procurement Code into Maryland law. I3 In
1976, the State waived sovereign immunity as a defense to written
contracts, thereby forcing executive accountability via judicial scrutiny of the procurement process. I4 The Maryland General Assembly
recognized the importance of establishing a neutral forum for bid
protests and contract disputes. Vendors and state officials realized
that decisions regarding the purchasing of billions of dollars of
goods and services would be made in the sunshine. Prior to that
time, the absence of any judicial process for disputes arising out of
state contracts meant, among other things, that there was no body
of law to guide future bid protests and disputes. There was little basis for public confidence that these matters would be resolved based
on merit rather than on malleable, political factors hardly related to
legal principles.
This Article reviews procurement law, decisions of the MSBCA,
regulations, and case law since 1986 and focuses on the rules concerning contract award. I5 Part II provides the current status of the
12.
13.

14.

15.

See generally Livingston, supra note 7, at 216-32.
See C. Fraser Smith, Lottery Bidding Now Politicized, Contractor Says, THE SUN
(BALT.), Nov. 30, 1990, at lD, available in 1990 WL 4113694. Around the time
Agnew resigned from the vice presidency, charges arose that he took kickbacks and bribes from contractors while he was the Governor of Maryland. See
id.
See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GoV'T § 12-201(a) (1999) ("[T]he State, its officers,
and its units may not raise the defense of sovereign immunity in a contract
action ... ").
For an overview of Maryland procurement law from the time prior to the enactment of the Procurement Article through 1986, see Livingston, supra note
7, at 215-45. It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the laws and procedures related to contract claims brought by either a contractor or the State.
See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §§ 15-215 to -223 (1995 & Supp. 1999);
COMAR 2l.lO.04.01 to .06. For a discussion of the discrepancies between the
State Finance and Procurement Article and COMAR Title 21 concerning
claims brought by the State, and the implications with respect to the MSBCA's
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law governing pre-solicitation communications between the procuring agency and the potential contractor. 16 Part III details the issuance of solicitations I? in the form of Requests for Proposals (RFPs) 18
or Invitations for Bids (IFBs) .19 Part IV discusses bid protests, the
method by which a contractor or vendor may raise objections to a
solicitation or the formation of a contract. 20 Part V discusses significant procedural considerations. 21 Part VI details the adverse consequences that the State would suffer as an indirect, yet substantial,
result of treating contractors unfairly.22
II.

PRE-SOLICITATION

In the "pre-solicitation phase" of state procurement, state officials first must decide what goods or services meet the using
agency's minimal needs. The procurement officer handles the
purchases of goods and services that other officials use to fulfill
their functions. 23
"Procurement" includes all the functions of the State that pertain to "buying, leasing as lessee, purchasing, or otherwise obtaining
any supplies, services, construction, [and] construction-related services . . . ."24 It reaches from the solicitation of sources and award
of the contracts to all phases of contract administration. 25 As the
"customer," the State enters into contracts with vendors for the
purchase of goods and services. The mechanics of contract formation on a state procurement level, akin to contracts in the private
sector, involve offer and acceptance. Ordinarily, in state procurejurisdiction, see University of Md. v. MFE Inc./NCP Architects, Inc., 345 Md.
86, 691 A.2d 676 (1997); Alcatel NA Cable Systems, Inc., 5 MSBCA t 458
(1999).
16. See infra notes 25-82 and accompanying text.
17. For the purposes of this Article, the term "solicitation" will often be used colloquially to refer to either the issuance of a Request for Proposals (RFPs) or
an Invitation for Bids (IFBs). Strictly, however, solicitation refers only to Requests for Proposals. The term "bid" will be used comprehensively to reach "a
bid, proposal, or other response to a solicitation." MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN.
& PROC. § 4-301(b).
18. See infra Part IlIA.
19. See infra Part III.B.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part V.
22. See infra Part VI.
23. For example, the Department of General Services procures police cars for the
Maryland State Police.
24. See COMAR 21.01.02.OlB(65) (1999).
25. See ill.
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ment, the potential vendor is the offeror and the State is the
offeree.
Prior to the issuance of a solicitation, the procurement officer
should examine the using agency's needs in light of the goods and
services available in the commercial marketplace. The procurement
officer often encounters potential vendors who encourage the State
to request the goods and services they sell. Such salesmanship may
lead the procurement officer and using agency to have a particular
preference for goods and services. Ordinarily, this is permissible unless the resulting specifications are unduly burdensome or
unethical. 26
Official publication of a solicitation starts the most visible phase
of procurement. It is a public statement that the State wishes to encourage potential parties to compete, by submission of bids or proposals, for contract award. En route to public solicitation, there are
various rules governing the parties during the pre-solicitation phase.

A.

The Specifications

The procurement officer has the difficult job of ensuring that
his "client"-the actual using agency that requires the goods and
services-obtains the goods and services necessary to do the job.
For example, the Department of General Services (DGS) purchases
office furniture so that another state agency is suitably equipped; it
likewise enters into contracts for bridges in state parks for the Department of Natural Resources. Not uncommonly, the procurement
officer or the using agency have a particular preference for a particular product by a particular manufacturer. The specifications may
be drafted to ident.ifY a particular article, "or equal," item. On the
other hand, it is impermissible to tailor the specifications so as to
confine the field of competition to a single vendor's particular
product. 27 Maryland state agencies are thus accustomed to the notion that was musically offered thirty years ago by the Rolling
Stones' MickJagger: "You can't always get what you want, but if you
try some time, you just might find, you get what you need. "28
The solicitation must include "specifications," defined as "clear
and accurate description[s] of the functional characteristics or the
26.
27.

28.

See MD. CODE ANN .. STATE GoV'T § 15-508 (1999 & Supp. 1999).
See COMAR 21.04.01.02A (providing that it is the "policy of the State that
specifications be written so as to permit maximum practicable competition
without modifying the State's requirements").
The Rolling Stones, You Can't Always Get What You Want, ABKCO (1971).
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nature of an item to be procured. "29 The goal is for the State to
procure goods or services in a cost-effective manner while, at the
same time, allowing for the maximum practicable competition from
vendors.30 To ensure that these competing interests are balanced
fairly, the parties are subject to the procurement laws as well as certain ethics guidelines mandated by the Maryland General Assembly.

B.

Pre-Solicitation

Potential contractors with Maryland must abide by the State's
ethics rules,31 especially the rules contained in sections 15-50832 and
15-703,33 respectively, of the State Government Article. Prior to 1993,
a potential vendor who believed the specifications were unduly restrictive or otherwise improper could file a bid protest pursuant to
COMAR 21.10.01; there was little threat of disqualification for the
vendor who managed to get the specifications tailored for his products. In 1994, the Maryland General Assembly reacted to a troublesome practice that had developed among certain state agencies. A
person, such as a state consultant or potential vendor, could excessively influence the procurement officer to draft the specifications
in such a way that the employer was "wired" for contract award.
As indicated in the Report of the "Miller Commission,"34 a person might influence the procurement officer to draft the specifications so that, as a practical matter, the State would end up buying
the goods from a particular vendor.35 The Report of the Miller
Commission gave an example of a consultant who advised the procurement officer on the type of fiber optic cable suitable for the
State. 36 Perhaps unlike the state officers, the consultant knew that
only his employer could satisfY the unduly restrictive specifications.
This influence demonstrated the problem where consultants take
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

35.
36.

COMAR 21.04.01.01.
See MD. CODE ANN .. STATE FiN. & PROC. § 13-205 (a) (1) (1995 & Supp. 1999);
COMAR 21.04.01.02A.
See generally MD. CODE ANN .. STATE GoV'T §§ 15-101 to -1001.
See id. § 15-508 (applying to participation in procurement).
See id. § 15-703 (requiring lobbyist registration with the State Ethics Commission ("Commission"».
See Report of the Joint Task Force on Maryland's Procurement Law, Maryland
General Assembly (Feb. 1994) (reviewing Maryland procurement laws to determine the proper role of the BPW, state agencies, Maryland General Assembly, and taxpayers in the procurement process).
See id. at 17-18.
See id. at 18 (describing a solicitation for a distance learning network that required items that could only be met by one vendor).
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undue advantage of solicitations to create future contract opportunities for themselves.
In reaction to this problem, the Maryland General Assembly
enacted section 15-508 of the State Government Article. 37 Section
I5-508(a) provides that:
[a]n individual who assists an executive unit in the drafting
of specifications, an invitation for bids, or a request for proposals for a procurement, or a person who employs the individual may not: (1) submit a bid or proposal for that procurement or; (2) assist another in his submission of a bid. 38
Unfortunately, the statute left unclear and undefined the meaning
of the verb "assist." There was no guidance in the Code or in any
regulations to define unethical assistance in the preparation of specifications, RFPs, or IFBs. Perhaps to aid in the interpretation of this
provision, the Maryland General Assembly later carved out certain
exemptions to section I5-508(a) in 1996. 39 The exact requirements
of section 15-508, however, still remain unclear. Vendors and executive officials seek and receive guidance only from the State Ethics
Commission (Commission),4O which issues rulings interpreting this
statute.
In the context of the procurement process, the objective of the
Commission is to protect the taxpayers' interests in fair competition
by making sure that there is no unfair advantage accorded to the
37.

3S.
39.

40.

See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GoV'T § IS-50S (regulating participation in procurement).
[d. § IS-S0S(a) (1)-(2).
See id. § IS-S0S(b). This section provides:
For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, assisting in the drafting of specifications, an invitation for bids, or a request for proposals
for a procurement does not include: (1) providing descriptive literature such as catalogue sheets, brochures, technical data sheets, or
standard specification "samples," whether requested by an executive
agency or provided on an unsolicited basis; (2) submitting written
comments on a specification prepared by an agency or on a solicitation for a bid or proposal when comments are solicited from two or
more persons as part of a request for information or a pre bid or
preproposal process; (3) providing specifications for a sole source
procurement made in accordance with § 13-107 of the State Finance
and Procurement Article; or (4) providing architectural and engineering services for programming, master planning, or other project
planning services.
[d.
See id. §§ IS-201 to -210 (pertaining to the Commission).
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overzealous or excessively influential potential vendor. The Commission must balance the efforts of vendors' aggressive sales representatives with the need to protect the State from undue influence. The
lofty goal of assuring a broad field of competition for satisfying the
State's minimal needs often puts the procurement officer at odds
with such representatives.
The Commission has issued advisory opinions dealing with what
constitutes assistance by the potential contractor. In one opinion,41
the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (DPSCS)
issued a request for a design contractor to review the agency's operation and to develop a plan to create an Offender Based Management Information System for collecting criminal information. 42 A
corporation that subsequently vyed for the contract prescribed operational and performance requirements for the agency computer system and provided a description of the required hardware and
software for the computer system. 43 The Commission concluded that
this participation constituted assistance pursuant to section IS-S08. 44
The corporation, in essence, created the subsequent procurement
contract. Therefore, the Commission concluded that section ISS08 45 precluded the corporation from bidding on the design contract it created. 46
In another advisory opinion concerning section IS-S08, the
Commission considered the potential disqualification of a consulting firm from the last two phases of a project that involved an
ongoing procurement with the DPSCS for the design and implementation of a Master Plan of a Corrections Information System. 47
A consulting firm had conducted a study for DPSCS that resulted in
a "Blueprint for a Master Plan for the Department" ("Blueprint"),
which was the first of the three phases in the project. 48 The Commission determined that the Blueprint served the same function as
41.
42.
43.
44.

45.
46.
47.
48.

See State Ethics Comm'n Advisory Op. No. 94-9 (Nov. 1, 1994). found in 21
Md. Reg. 2032 (Nov. 25, 1994).
See id.
See id. at 2032-33.
See id.
At the time of the opinion, this was section 3-110 of the Maryland Public Ethics Law. See id. at 2032.
See id. at 2033.
See State Ethics Comm'n Advisory Op. No. 98-9 (Dec. 9, 1998), found in 26
Md. Reg. 140, 140 Gan. 15, 1999).
See id. The department was looking to reorganize or "reengineer" its organizational structure and its formation management systems. See id.

10
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the program document in capital projects-it described the anticipated organizational and informational structure for the Master
Plan. 49 The Blueprint was a fundamental part of the specifications
for what was to be procured for the second phase (Le., design) ;50
therefore, the Commission concluded that the consulting firm
could not participate in the ongoing procurement due to the prohibition of section 15-508. 51
The Commission also considered how long a consultant's involvement in early stages of a contract affected later involvement. 52
Regarding the consulting firm's involvement in the third phase of
the project (i.e., implementation), the Commission found that the
consulting firm could compete. 53 The involvement in preparing the
Blueprint was sufficiendy remote and would not be viewed as having
assisted in !he specifications for the implementation contract. 54 The
length of time that involvement in the early stage of a project impacts an individual's later involvement is a factual issue. 55 The Commission noted that if "the same documents continue to be the substantial basis for subsequent procurements, then assistance in
developing the initial documents could be viewed as assistance in
specification drafting in later procurement actions."56 Here, however, it appeared that the Blueprint would not be a significant factor in the implementation of the project. 57 Thus, the Commission
advised that section 15-508 would not bar the consulting firm from
bidding or participating in the implementation contract, "as long as
in fact it has no role in the design functions to be carried out by
the current procurement and the Blueprint it created has been
largely superseded by the more detailed ongoing design activities. "58
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

54.
55.
56.
57.

5S.

See id. at 141 (detennining that the Blueprint fonned a part of the specifications for the ongoing procurement).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. (deciding that section 15-50S would not bar the contractor's participation in the implementation contract as long as the Blueprint did not playa vital role in this phase).
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id. (noting that "it appears that the Master Plan design document will include significantly more detail and specific infonnation only very generally
suggested by the Blueprint," and adding that if it was detennined that the
Blueprint had a [ole in later design functions, the decision may be different).
Id.
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Although section 15-508 prohibits the excessive influence by
vendors in some procurement settings, it makes little sense in
others, such as when the State seeks to procure engineering services
for a large capital project. In such instances, there are several steps
to the process. Usually, an engineer is hired to provide a preliminary conceptual design. If funds are approved by the Maryland
General Assembly for the project, then there are more detailed
drawings and specifications for the construction of the project and
later phases for inspection. The original engineer who designs the
conceptual, preliminary sketches assists in the procurement of the
second phase and would necessarily have a competitive advantage.
Yet, this industry is structured around a single engineer becoming familiar with the project and cost-effectively providing the subsequent phases of engineering work. Eventually, through a combination of legislative and administrative decisions, the Commission
accommodated this industry. This accommodation is illustrated in a
1999 ethics opinion. 59 The DGS requested advice regarding an architect/ engineering firm that prepared program and preliminary
schematic designs for a capital construction project for which detailed design services were being procured. 60 Later, DGS solicited
expressions of interest that would be the basis for the selection of a
designer. 61 The program document and preliminary schematic drawings provided the basis for funding requests to the General
Assembly.62
The Commission advised that the work performed by the architect/ engineering firm constituted architectural and engineering services that are exempted from the procurement assistance prohibitions in section 15-508 (a), even though the work included some
schematic drawings. 63 The Commission explained that, although the
documents were mentioned in the RFP and were intended to be a
starting point for the successful design contractor, the firm's activity
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See State Ethics Comm'n Advisory Op. No. 99-1 (Jan. 26, 1999), found in 26
Md. Reg. 403 (1999).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 404 (citing MD. CODE ANN .. STATE FIN. & PRoe. § 15-508(b) (4) (1995
& Supp. 1999». The Commission distinguished a previous Advisory Opinion,
No. 98-1. See id. The Commission determined that if the firm actually prepared procurement documents, it was not permitted to bid on the design
contract. See State Ethics Comm'n Advisory Op. No. 98-1 (Apr. 7, 1998), found
in 25 Md. Reg. 707, 708 (1998).
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stopped short of the actual preparation of the bid. 64 In 1996, the
Maryland General Assembly added section IS-S08(b) (4), thereby expressly enabling these consultants to participate in all phases of the
procuremen t. 65
In another opinion,66 the Commission considered a request for
advice regarding section IS-S08 from a current manager of DGS
who was responsible for the Energy Performance Contract Program. 67 The manager was significantly involved in developing the initial Indefinite Delivery Contract (IDC), managing projects developed under the IDC, and generating RFP materials. 68 He was also
considering leaving the DGS to work for one of the potential vendors for the program. 69 In addressing the manager's transfer, the
Commission applied section IS-S08. 70 The Commission ruled that if
a state employee becomes an employee of a private company, that
company is excluded from any involvement in bidding on a procurement contract in which the former state employee was
involved.71
64.
65.
66.

67.
6S.
69.
70.

71.

See id. (determining that the firm's work fit within what the legislature intended to be covered as an exception under section 15-50S(b)(4».
For the text of section 15-50S(b) (4), see supra note 39 and accompanying text.
See State Ethics Comm'n Advisory Op. No. 99-5 (Aug. 27, 1999), found in 26
Md. Reg. 1595 (1999).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. (observing that, although the ethics provision of section IS-50S primarily impacts private individuals and entities involved in defining an agency's
needs in the context of procurement, state employees involved in RFP preparation or specifications who then leave to join private entities that are, or expect to be, involved in submitting a bid or proposal on the procurement
could also be affected by the ethics provision).
See id. The Commission added that the company is excluded even if the new
employee does not participate in the bid or proposal. See id. In this opinion,
the Commission also considered sections 15-501 and 15-504(b) of the State
Government Article. See id. at 1595-96. Section 15-501 prohibits an employee
from participating in any matter in which he has an interest or which involves
an entity with which he is negotiating or has an arrangement regarding prospective employment. See MD. CODE ANN .. STATE GOV'T § 15-501 (a) (1999 &
Supp. 1999). The Commission advised that the DGS manager could not participate in matters where he has applied for employment with a proposed vendor. See State Ethics Comm'n Advisory op. No. 99-5, found in 26 Md. Reg. at
1595. The Commission also considered section 15-504(b), which "prohibits a
former employee from assisting or representing a party other than the State
in a matter involving the State if the former employee participated significantly in the matter as part of his official duties." Id. at 1596 (citing MD. CODE
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Lobbying and Procurement

There is also a link, again easy to feel but difficult to explain,
between past abuses in contract award and present procurement
practices. Maryland has an unfortunate history of abuse by a few officials. The current statutory regime was developed in response to
Vice President Spiro Agnew's notorious bribery activity.72 The 1977
resignation of Secretary of Transportation (and later Governor)
Harry R. Hughes grew out of alleged tampering by then Governor
Marvin Mandel who allegedly used political favoritism in awarding
subway contracts. 73 The 1991 award by the Maryland State Lottery
Agency for On-Line Computer Gaming led to the investigation and
unrelated federal felony conviction of a prominent lobbyist who
represented the controversial awardee of the lottery contract. 74 In
1998, the Chairman of the House Economic and Governmental
Matters Committee resigned in the wake of allegations that he
wrongfully influenced a state agency to procure insurance services
from his firm.75 In the same Maryland General Assembly session, the

72.

73.

74.

75.

ANN., STATE GoV'T § 15-504 (b) ). "Matter" has been interpreted to include any
proceeding, application, submission, request for ruling, contract, claim, case,
or other such matter. See id. The Commission determined that the manager
was significantly involved in the program, in specification drafting, and proposal evaluation. See id. As a result, the manager was barred from assisting any
vendor in any way on any project that arose from the current or original IDC.
See id.
See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
See Smith, supra note 13, at ID; C. Fraser Smith, Lobbyists Duel Over Lottery Contract Tests State Procurement, THE SUN (BALT.), Dec. 23, 1990, at 3J, available in
1990 WL 4119236 (discussing the history leading up to the passage of Maryland procurement law). Governor Mandel was later found guilty of mail fraud
and racketeering. See United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1352 (4th Cir.
1979). Ten years after the conviction and after serving ten months in jail, Governor Mandel's convictions were vacated. See United States v. Mandel, 862 F.2d
1067, 1068 (4th Cir. 1988).
See C. Fraser Smith, Maker of Lottery Machines is Earning Big Numbers, THE SUN
(BALT.), June 23, 1991, at El, available in 1991 WL 5882426. The "highest paid
lobbyist in Annapolis," Bruce Bereano, was hired by the company to win the
lottery contract. See id. Bereano was subsequently charged with mail fraud as
a result of his lobbying activities. See United States v. Bereano, 161 F.3d 3, 1998
WL 553445 (4th Cir. 1998) (unpublished). Bereano was later disbarred in Maryland, Washington, D.C., and the Supreme Court. See Attorney Grievance
Comm'n v. Bereano, 357 Md. 321, 744 A.2d 35 (2000); In re Bereano, 719 A.2d
98 (D.C. 1998); In re Disbarment of Bereano, 525 U.S. 1119 (1999).
See C. Fraser Smith, Playing Rope-a-Dope with Ethics; Strategy: Despite Three Investigations, the General Assembly has Chosen to Take a Defensive, Rather than Offensive,
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Senate expelled a senator involved in health care contracting mat~
ters because he allegedly abused his position by allegedly forcing a
state university to procure insurance services from his own agency.76
These abuses discourage the use of competitive sealed propo~
als, causing taxpayers to suffer.77 Properly or not, there is a perception that subjective criteria for award may invite political influence
in the selection of the awardee. 78 The Maryland General Assembly
took a step to deal with this concern when it enacted section 15~701
of the State Government Article, which requires registration, with
the Commission, of any "executive lobbyist" who seeks to influence
officials on a procurement contract. 79 Unfortunately, those who
wrongfully corrupt the procurement system seldom register with the
Commission, and those who properly register seldom corrupt. 80
For attorneys who enter their appearances at the MSBCA on
behalf of a client, such as a state contractor, it seems unnecessary to
register as an executive lobbyist. After all, communications with
MSBCA officials are highly regulated, seldom ex parte, and not
amenable to the harmful practices which gave rise to the legislative
registration requirement for those who aim to lobby political appointees and elected officials.

76.

77.

78.
79.
80.

Approach in Dealing with the Issue of Ethics, THE SUN (BALT.), Mar. 10, 1998, at
2B, available in 1998 WL 4955341 (characterizing the legislative session as being "dominated" by ethics controversies).
See C. Fraser Smith et ai., A Life of Highs, Lows and a Final Fall; His Rapid Rise
to Power and Stunning Resilience Can't Save Young in the End; SENATE EXPELS
YOUNG, THE SUN (BALT.), Jan. 17, 1998, at 6A, available in 1998 WL 4947163
(tracing Larry Young's legislative career up to the Senate's vote to expel him).
See, e.g., David S. Sullivan, Disappointed Bidder Standing to Challenge a Government
Contract Award: A Proposal For Change in Kentucky Procurement Law, 88 Ky. LJ.
161, 169 (2000) (conceding that competitive bidding requirements indirectly
benefit taxpayers); Michael F. Mason, Bid Protests and the U.S. District
Courts-Why Congress Should Not Allow the Sun to Set on This Effective Relationship,
26 PUB. CONT. LJ. 567, 588-89 (1997) (splitting the "government contract community" into two camps, one of which believes that taxpayers and contractors
possess a valid interest in a procurement system that complies with a strict
statutory framework).
See Livingston, supra note 7, at 217-18 (discussing Maryland's history of procurement, including awards that were based on subjective criteria).
See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GoV'T § 15-701 (1999 & Supp. 1999).
See generally Jason D. Kaune, Exporting Ethics: Lessons from Russia's Attempt to Regulate Federal Lobbying, 20 HAsTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 815, 818 (1997); Robert F. Bauer, Lobby Registration Rules, PLi/CoRP. 103 (1993).
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III. PROCUREMENT METHODS
Agencies may use various methods in procuring goods and services: 81 competitive sealed bidding;82 competitive sealed proposals;83
noncompetitive negotiation for human, social or educational services;84 sole source procurement;85 emergency or expedited procurement;86 small procurement;87 and intergovernmental cooperative
purchasing. 88 State solicitations for goods and services reflect a confluence of interests from several parties. The procurement officer
brings his professional experience and a real desire to serve his client, especially in light of any new requirements by the using agency
for which the goods and services are purchased. The vendors care
mostly about what goods and services must be provided and how
they will get paid. The taxpayers and their legislative representatives
focus on getting the best value, rather than merely the low bid
price on the date of contract award. The competing interests of the
procurement officer, the vendor, and the taxpayer are reflected in
various decisions of the MSBCA, as outlined below.

A. Competitive Sealed Bidding
Competitive sealed bidding is the preferred method of solicitation. 89 It is accomplished by the issuance of an IFB. IFBs are used
by the State when the main criterion for award is low price. 90 For
commodities, such as salt for the highways, stationery, or police
cars, price is the sole criterion for selection because the IFB establishes the standards for quality, quantity, and time of delivery. 9I By
See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §§ 13-101 to -323 (1995 & Supp. 1999);
COMAR 21.03.01.05 (1999).
82. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 13-103; COMAR 21.05.01.01A.
83. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §§ 13-104 to -105; COMAR 21.
05.01.0lB.
84. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 13-106; COMAR 21.05.01.01F.
85. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 13-107; COMAR 21.05.01.0lD(I).
86. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 13-108; COMAR 21.05.01.0lD(2).
87. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 13-109; COMAR 21.05.01.01E.
88. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 13-110; COMAR 21.05.01.01G.
89. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 13-102 (a) (providing that procurement bids shall be made with competitive bidding, unless another type of bid
is specifically authorized); COMAR 21.05.01.02.
90. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 13-103 (a)(2) (ii) (stating that an IFB
must disclose whether the contract will be awarded based on the lowest bid
price, the lowest evaluated bid price, or, pursuant to section 11-202, the bid
most favorable to the State).
91. See COMAR 21.06.03.0lB(2) ("The objective when selecting a contract type is
81.
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contrast, for procurement of medical services for state employees or
design services for a building, technical expertise likely outweighs
the importance of price in selection.92 Practically speaking, the statute uses IFBs normally for the procurement of goods, where, once
there is a standard for the types of goods needed, low price is the
most important factor in source selection.
1.

Notice to Vendors

The State must furnish public notice of all IFBs where the bid
amount is reasonably expected to exceed $25,000. 93 The public notice requirement is usually fulfilled by publishing notice in the Maryland Contract Weekly,94 a weekly newsletter alerting potential offerors of state, county, and city solicitations; in the Maryland Register,95
and beginning in 1999, on the Internet. 96 The notice must be published at least twenty days prior to the submission of bids to allow
bidders a reasonable opportunity to formulate their bids. 97 There
must be public notice of bids under $25,000 at least ten days prior
to submission of bids. 98
2.

Pre-Bid Meetings

Mter IFB issuance, agencies hold a pre-bid meeting pursuant to
COMAR 21.05.02.07. Notice of the conference is made to all potential bidders who were sent an IFB or who the procurement officer
knows received an IFB.99 Agencies can encourage, but cannot require, attendance at pre-bid meetings. 1oo At the meetings, the proto obtain the best value in the time required and at the lowest cost or price
or greatest revenue to the State.").
92. See id. 21.12.02.11B(I)-(6) (listing the general qualification criteria for procurement of architectural and engineering services).
93. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § l3-103(c)(3) (i); COMAR 21.
05.02.04B.
94. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 13-103(c) (3).
95. See COMAR 21.05.02.04B.
96. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PRoc. § 13-103(c)(3). By 1999, the Maryland
Contract Weekly was supplemented by the availability of an on-line service. See
Contract Weekly Online (last modified Jul. 21, 1999) <http:/ /
www.sos.state.md.us/sos/dsd/cweekly/html>. As with other states, Maryland
has made an Internet site available to potential offerors where upcoming contract opportunities are posted.
97. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 13-103(c) (2).
98. See id. § 13-103 (c) (3).
99. See COMAR 21.05.02.07B.
100. See id. 21.05.02.07D. There is one exception to the non-mandatory nature of
pre-bid conferences: each solicitation with Minority Business Enterprise
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curement officer explains the requirements of the IFB.101 The prebid meeting usually provides an opportunity for the procurement
officer to answer questions of the prospective bidders. In practice,
competitors are disinclined to ask questions, lest their competition
get educated as a consequence. State officials' statements at the prebid meeting do not, however, change the requirements of the
IFB.102 Instead, changes to an IFB may only be made by a written
amendment authorized by the procurement officer. 103

3.

Amendments to Solicitations

One aspect of fair treatment in the procurement process is to
put bidders on equal footing in the competition. Following the initial solicitation, but prior to the submission of bids or proposals by
offerors, the procurement officer may issue amendments to a solicitation. I04 Amendments are distributed within a reasonable time so as
to allow prospective bidders ample time to consider the changes to
the solicitation in preparing their bids.105 The procurement officer
must send amendments to all potential bidders to whom IFBs were
sent or to anyone the procurement officer knows obtained the
IFB.106 Bidders should be diligent. While there is no duty on the

101.
102.

(MBE) opportunities shall contain a provision requiring bidders or offerors to
"[a] ttend prebid or other meetings the procurement agency schedules to
publicize contracting opportunities to MBEs." Id. 21.11.03.09B(2) (b) (v). For
detailed MBE policies, see MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §§ 14-301 to
-308; COMAR 21.11.03.01 to .09. Prior to an amendment to COMAR stating
that attendance at pre-bid meetings was not mandatory, the Attorney General
opined that a bid or proposal could not be rejected on the ground that the
offeror failed to attend a pre-bid or pre-proposal meeting, even if the agency
had designated attendance at the conference to be mandatory. See also 72 Op.
Md. Att'y Gen. 239 (1987).
See COMAR 21.05.02.07A.
See id. 21.05.02.07D ("Nothing stated at the pre-bid conference may change
the invitation for bids unless a change is made by the procurement officer by
written amendment.
Even though pre-bid meeting minutes are required, see
MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 13-21O(a), the minutes may not be considered to constitute an amendment to the IFB. See Odyssey Contracting Co.,
4 MSBCA 11 317 (1992) (holding that amendments to IFBs may be accomplished by addenda only and not by pre-bid meeting minutes); see also MD.
CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 13-2 10 (a) (requiring minutes on conferences
held for a procurement that is expected to exceed $100,000).
See COMAR 21.05.02.08A.
See id.
See id. 21.05.02.08C.
See id. 21.05.02.08B.
H

).

103.
104.
105.
106.
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procuring agency to insure that potential bidders received the
amendment, failure of a bidder to acknowledge receipt of a material addendum usually renders the bid "nonresponsive. "107
The State wants assurance that the bidders will perform all of
the work required, including the work set forth in the newly issued
addendum. It follows that each bidder must expressly indicate that
it offers to provide the goods and services set forth not only on the
original solicitation, but also as modified by the amendment.
So strongly does the State believe in this that it will regularly,
and summarily, reject any bidder who fails to acknowledge receipt
of a material addendum. In the short run, it may cost the State
more money by eliminating an otherwise low bidder's offer. In the
long run, however, this rejection of bids supports the integrity of
the procurement process and encourages competition. This rigid
posture requires bidders, as of bid opening, to demonstrate a clear
intention to comply with all the contract requirements, including
those set forth in the amendment. In one example involving the
Kent Narrows Bridge contract award, the low bidder failed to acknowledge receipt of a material amendment involving $36,000 in
site utility work. 108 The procurement officer properly rejected the
low bid as nonresponsive in favor of the second low bidder, whose
bid was $1,500,000 higher on the approximately $39,000,000
contract. 109
If the amendment is material, the bidder must acknowledge its
receipt of the amendmentYo For example, in Oak lawn Development
Corp.,111 the Maryland Transit Administration (MTA) issued an IFB
for landscape work and later issued two amendments. The first
amendment served several purposes, including an increase in the
quantity of some bid items, substitute bid form sheets, specifications
for certain items of work, and a new provision pertaining to
safety.ll2 The second amendment corrected typographical errors of
the first amendment.ll3 The Appellant failed to acknowledge receipt
of either amendment and failed to use the bid forms provided by
107. See Elecuic Motor Indus., 3 MSBCA t 262 at 3 (1990). See also discussion infra
Part IIIA.6 and text accompanying note 202.
108. See Conversation of Scott A. Livingston and David A. Bramble of David A.
Bramble, Inc., on Nov. 10, 1992 (notes on file with the author).
109. See id.
110. 2 MSBCA 1: 138 (1986).
111. See id. at 2.
112. See id.
113. See id.
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the first amendment. 114
The MSBCA stated that" [a] bidder's failure to acknowledge a
material IFB amendment by bid opening renders the bid nonresponsive and thus unacceptable since, absent such an acknowledgment,
the government's acceptance of the bid would not legally obligate
the bidder to meet the government's needs as identified in the
amendment."115 "Material" criteria usually include price, quantity,
quality, and time of delivery.1l6 The MSBCA also observed that
whenever a bidder "does not acknowledge an amendment imposing
new legal obligations [the bidder] may be viewed as attempting ...
to reserve to itself an election after bid opening to speak up and
agree to perform the added requirements or stand silent and let its
bid be rejected as nonresponsive. "117 It would undermine the integrity of the procurement process if a bidder, whether shrewdly or
mistakenly, had the opportunity to opt in or out of a contract award
after the other bid prices were revealed. 118
If the amendment is not material, however, the bidder need
not acknowledge it. 119 In a rather early case, Liberty Rnofing Co., DGS
issued an IFB for roofing work at Morgan State University.120 A disappointed bidder protested the award of the contract to the low
bidder who failed to, among other things, acknowledge receipt of
an amendment to the IFB that imposed a less strict specification
standard. 121 The amendment made performance of the work less
expensive. 122
The MSBCA denied the protest and held that acknowledgment
of the amendment was not necessary because the amendment relaxed the specifications and resulted in a decreased cost of perform-

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

120.
121.
122.

See id. at 3.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 6.
See COMAR 21.05.02.11 (providing that bids shall be opened publicly, therefore allowing all bidders to know their competitors' bid prices).
See Liberty Roofing Co., 1 MSBCA 1 77, at 7 (1984) (determining that in such
circumstances, there is no prejudice to other bidders); see also Baltimore Motor Coach Co., 1 MSBCA 1 94 (1985) ("[F]ailure to acknowledge an addendum in a negotiated procurement necessarily does not preclude consideration
of the affected proposal and the omission properly may be made the subject
of later discussions and negotiations.").
1 MSBCA 1 77, at 2.
See id. at 7.
See id.
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ance to the contractor. 123 According to the MSBCA: "Under such
circumstances, there is no prejudice that can result to other bidders
by acceptance of the otherwise low "responsive" bid based on original specifications that are more onerous than the specifications as
amended." 124
4.

Pre-Bid Explanations

In preparing bids and proposals, potential vendors frequently
contact the procurement officer or an authorized representative for
more information about the contract opportunity. The procurement
officer is generally accessible to the potential contractors and the
procurement officer's name and phone number are usually included in the RFP or IFB. This accessibility often leads potential
contractors to call the procurement officer when a question or
problem arises in the preparation of a bid or proposal. Potential
contractors, however, should seldom rely on such oral information;
oral pre-bid interpretations are not binding on the State. 125
In many ways, procurement of goods and services by the state
differs from traditional purchasing in the private arena; this inconsistency is well-illustrated in the area of pre-bid oral communications with state officials. In the private sector, the potential vendor
talks frequently with the customer. The parties negotiate until the
product offered suits the customer's tastes and budget. These communications between the potential buyer and seller are reasonable
given that the potential customer owes no duties, legal or otherwise,
to keep other potential vendors on equal footing.
In contrast, the procurement officers spend public funds and
the rules are different. The Maryland General Assembly has determined that potential vendors should be on roughly equal footing in
competing for state procurement contracts. 126 Therefore, any pre123. See id.
124. Id. The MSBCA waived the failure to acknowledge the amendment as a minor
irregularity. For a discussion of minor irregularities in bids, see infra notes
225-28 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 126-60 and accompanying text.
126. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 11-201 (a) (2) (1995 & Supp. 1999)
(listing one of the purposes of the procurement regulations as "ensuring fair
and equitable treatment of all person[s] who deal with the State procurement
system"); see also Capitol Dental Supply, Inc., 2 MSBCA 1 161, at 4 (1987) (restating the "equal footing" requirement in Maryland procurement law); J&L
Indus., 1 MSBCA'lI 98, at 5-6 (1985); Granite Constr. Co., 1 MSBCA'I 8, at 8-9
(1981) (labeling "equal information for all bidders [as] an essential feature of
the competitive bid process").
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bid explanation offered by the procurement officer to a single vendor cannot reasonably bind the procurement officer or the State. 127
The reason is simple: it is unfair for the procurement officer to tell
one favored vendor certain information when the other vendors
would not know that same information. It might give one vendor an
unfair competitive advantage over the other vendors and would certainly give an appearance of favoritism by the state official to a particular vendor. For newcomers to the procurement system, it seems
odd that the potential vendor cannot rely on the tIuthfulness of the
procurement officer's oral explanation to bind the state. It is among
the numerous anomalies that justify characterizing the procurement
system as "Byzantine." In the narrow context of procurement law,
this ruling is logical in order to give the public and contractors confidence in the integrity of the procurement system. 128
One landmark case established that pre-bid oral statements do
not bind the State. 129 In Granite Construction CO.,130 the MTA issued
an IFB for the constIuction of a certain stIucture and tunnel associated with Baltimore's public transportation system. 131 In preparing
its bid, the appellant's chief estimator was uncertain whether the
potential contractor would be required to relocate gas mains.132 The
chief estimator telephoned the MTA and spoke with the project engineer,133 who ultimately told the chief estimator that the contractor
would not be responsible for relocating the gas mains. 134 The appellant prepared its bid accordingly.135 During the life of the contract,
the MTA informed the appellant that it would have to relocate the
127. See Granite Constr. Co., 1 MSBCA at 8 (reiterating that oral instructions or clarifications are not binding unless offered at a conference to which the bidders
were invited).
128. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 11-201 (a)(3) (listing one of the purposes of the procurement system as "providing safeguards for maintaining a
State procurement system of quality and integrity").
129. See Granite Constr. Co., 1 MSBCA t 8 (1991), afl'd, Mass Transit v. Granite
Constr. Co., 57 Md. App. 766, 471 A.2d 1121 (1984).
130. 1 MSBCA t 8 (1981), afl'd, Mass Transit Admin. v. Granite Constr. Co., 57 Md.
App. 766, 471 A.2d 1121 (1984). For a discussion of other repercussions in
Maryland procurement law as a result of the court of special appeals case, see
Livingston, supra note 7, at 23940.
131. See Granite Constr. Co., 1 MSBCA at 2.
132. See id. at 6.
133. See id. (describing the information sought and received by the estimator).
134. See id.
135. See id. (explaining that the estimator prepared a bid that did not include the
gas main relocation).
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gas mains. 136 The MTA denied appellant's claim for an equitable adjustment for the additional costs incurred for the relocation of the
gas mains. 137
The MSBCA determined that the appellant could not recover
for the additional costs for several reasons. 138 The IFB contained a
provision that oral explanations to bidders would not be binding on
the MTA. 139 The MSBCA also indicated that the MTA was not estopped from repudiating the clarification given by the MTA's project engineer. l40 Under Maryland law, the party claiming estoppel
must "show that it had a clear right to rely upon the clarification issued."141 The appellant had no right to rely on the statement by the
MTA's project engineer, so the MTA could not be estopped by his
action.142
While the rule that a bidder may not rely on a clarification provided by an employee of the procuring agency may seem unfair, it
is actually more equitable to all bidders. In Capitol Dental Supply,
Inc.,143 the DGS solicited bids for dental equipment, including dental chairs with a hydraulic base. l44 The manager of one bidder, Deeley Dental Supply Company ("Deeley"), called the DGS buyer responsible for the procurement to ask whether dental chairs with an
electromechanical base, as opposed to a hydraulic base, would be
acceptable. 145 The DGS buyer advised the manager that such chairs
would be acceptable, but did not communicate his alleged approval
to the procurement officer or to other prospective bidders.l46 Of
the bidders, only Deeley submitted a bid for chairs with elec136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

143.
144.
145.
146.

See id.
See id. at 7.
See id. at 8-11.
See id. at 8.
See id. at 10.
Id. (citing Anne Arundel County v. Whitehall Venture, 39 Md. App. 197, 205,
384 A.2d 780, 786 (1978».
See id. at 11 (determining that the appellant's reliance on an oral clarification,
rather than seeking an addendum, constituted a lack of diligence); see also
Concrete General, Inc., 1 MSBCA 1: 87, at 14 (1984) (holding that an agency
employee with no authority to act contractually on behalf of the agency could
not bind the agency by his interpretation of the contract in the absence of
clear evidence which would impute the employee's knowledge to an authorized official of the agency).
2 MSBCA 'lI 161 (1987).
See id. at 2.
See id.
See id.

1999]

Maryland Procurement Law

23

tromechanical bases. 147 The price difference between hydraulic and
electromechanical chairs made Deeley the low bidder l4s and DGS
was poised to recommend Deeley for contract award. 149
The second low bidder filed a bid protest challenging the
award of the contract to Deeley,150 claiming that the low vendor's
bid was non-responsive. 151 The DGS decided that, despite contract
language requiring a hydraulic base chair, Deeley's electromechanical base chair met the minimal needs of the agency.152 DGS also argued that the second low bidder, like Deeley, could have contacted
DGS prior to bid opening to determine whether DGS would accept
a dental chair with a non-hydraulic base. 153
The MSBCA stated "Maryland procurement law requires that
bidders compete on an equal footing, and that one bidder not be
accorded a competitive advantage to the prejudice of the other bidders by the action of the State. "154 Therefore, Deeley was not permitted to offer a type of dental chair that did not meet the specifications of the IFB.155 Its bid was rejected as nonresponsive. 156 The
MSBCA also noted that it was irrelevant that competitors could have
contacted DGS about acceptance of other types of chairs.157 The
pre-bid communication with the DGS employee was not authorized
and Deeley had no right to rely on any representation that was
made by the employee. 15S The MSBCA further elaborated that the
procurement officer and the agency head, not the DGS employee
involved, were ultimately responsible for the content, clarity, and
completeness of the specifications. 159 From this discussion, it is clear
147. See id. at 3. The MSBCA noted that Deeley submitted an alternate bid that included a hydraulic base, but that it was refused by DGS pursuant to COMAR
21.05.02.21. See id at 2 n.2.
148. See id. at 3.
149. See id. (indicating that the DGS had reversed its earlier determination that
Deeley's bid was nonresponsive). For a discussion of the procedural aspects of
contract award, see infra notes 251-57 and accompanying text.
150. See Capitol Dental Supply, Inc., 2 MSBCA at 3. For a discussion of bid protests,
see infra Part IV.
151. See Capitol Dental Supply, Inc., 2 MSBCA at 3. For a discussion of the responsiveness of bidders, see infra notes 202-13 and accompanying text.
152. See Capitol Dental Supply Inc., 2 MSBCA at 3.
153. See id. at 4.
154. Id.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id.; see also COMAR 21.04.01.04 (1999) (providing that the procurement of-
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that Maryland law mandates that any material change to the IFB resulting from a pre-bid inquiry must be communicated to all other
prospective bidders in the form of a written amendment to the IFB
before it can be relied upon when completing a bid. l60
5.

Evaluation and Award

Competitive sealed bidding contemplates award to the "responsible" and "responsive" 161 bidder who meets the bid requirements
and the evaluation criteria set forth in the solicitation and submits
the most favorable bid price or the most favorable evaluated bid
price. 162 Bids must be evaluated exclusively on the objective evaluation criteria set forth in the IFB.163 The requirement of "objective
criteria" means that the criteria must be made known to, or ascertainable by, the bidder at the time his bid is being prepared. l64
There are at least two strong reasons why the specifications
should clearly identify the basis upon which the offeror's bid proposal will be evaluated. First, it allows the field of competing vendors
to understand what the State really wants based on the stated factors it will use to choose the awardee. Vendors should compete
based on ingenuity and creativity, not "inside information," to provide the best product or services necessary to satisfy the government's needs. Most vendors will pursue contracts that fall into their
particular niche, and obviously, this serves the State's interest as
well.
Second, it is unfair for the government to apply some mysterious or unstated criterion in the selection of the contractor. Where
the parties provide essentially the same services, usually price governs the selection. If there are big differences in technical approaches to serving the State's needs, the criteria for selection
should be well known so that the potential awardees will understand
that their proposals are judged on the merits~ It is disheartening for
flcer is responsible for reviewing the specifications).
160. See COMAR 21.05.02.08; see also Odyssey Contracting Co., 4 MSBCA 1 317
(1992) (stating that amendments to IFBs may be accomplished by addenda
only and not by pre-bid meeting minutes).
161. For a discussion of "responsiveness" and "responsibility," see infra section
III.A.6 and accompanying text.
162. See MD. CODE ANN .. STATE FIN. & PROC. § 13-103(e) (1995 & Supp. 1999);
COMAR 21.05.02.13A.
163. See COMAR 21.05.02.13A, .13B ("Only objectively measurable criteria which
are set forth in the invitation for bids shall be applied in determining the
most favorable evaluated bid price.").
164. See Neoplan USA Corp., 1 MSBCA 1 76, at 23-24 (1984) (citations omitted).
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a vendor to spend thousands of dollars developing a proposal, only
to learn that the State eventually decided to pick the awardee based
on some trivial consideration.
In PTC Corp. & Ion Track Instruments, Inc.,165 the DGS issued an
IFB for drug and explosive detection devices. l66 In error, an older
specification was used in the IFB.167 Instead of specifying that at
least thirty substances be simultaneously detectable by the devices,
the specification required devices that detected only fifteen. 168 In rejecting the low bid, the procurement officer stated that bidders devices were nonresponsive to the needs of the requesting agency-not
that the devices were nonresponsive to the specifications. 169
Although not outcome-determinative,170 the MSBCA stated that
the agency did not evaluate the bids according to the specifications
in the IFB but, rather, according to the more stringent specifications that should have been listed in the IFB.171 The MSBCA concluded that a bid should be evaluated based upon the responsiveness of the bid to the specifications in the IFB, not the unstated or
unidentified needs of the procuring agency.172

6.

Responsible Versus Responsive

The State should not award contracts to bidders whose
promises to perform are not credible, or whose promises fall short
of the State's requirements. Award of a contract is to be made to
the "responsible and responsive bidder" whose bid meets the requirements set forth in the IFB and whose bid is the lowest bid
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

5 MSBCA'I 430 (1998).
See id. at 2.
See id. at 3.
See id.
See id. at 3-4.
The MSBCA determined it did not have jurisdiction to consider this appeal
based on the untimeliness of the bid protest. See id. at 6. Because the MSBCA
had to hear evidence to determine the close question of timeliness, however,
the MSBCA offered its insights regarding the substantive failings of the evaluation of the bids. See id. (clarifYing that the solicitation at issue should not
serve as a model under procurement law).
171. See id.
172. See id. at 7; see also JTE Contractors, Inc., 5 MSBCA 1 391, at 4 (1996) (determining that it is improper to make an award baSed on a change in the IFB
requirements that occurs after bid opening and prior to award); Honeywell,
Inc., 2 MSBCA, 148, at 10 (1987) (" [I]t is fundamental that an agency may
not solicit quotations on one basis and then make award on another basis.").
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price or the lowest evaluated bid price. 173 According to Maryland
regulations: "'Responsible' means a person who has the capability
in all respects to perform fully the contract requirements, and the
integrity and reliability that shall assure good faith performance. "174
In other words, responsibility encompasses a bidder's capability to
fulfill the terms of the contract. 175
The procurement officer is accorded broad discretion in measuring the responsibility of a bidder. Mter all, the procurement officer will be in the direct position to enjoy or endure the vendor's
performance. If the offeror's promises to perform are not credible-perhaps because his past promises have not proven crediblethen the procurement officer is free to reject the bidder. It is a
grave determination and one that dramatically affects a business's
ability to receive contracts with the State from that point forward. It
is not as serious as determining that the bidder should be "debarred" 176-denied the property right to obtain state contracts. Nevertheless, a determination of "non-responsibility" can seriously undermine a bidder's potential for competing for future contracts.
Where the government procurement officer determines the
bidder is responsible, it is seldom reversible by the MSBCA in any
bid -protest appeal. 177 There is a good reason for this. The MSBCA
does not serve as a "super" procurement officer. 178 It is mainly the
procurement officer who will suffer harm if the bidder proves to be
incapable of performing in accordance with its promises. As set
forth in H.A. Hams,179 the procurement officer makes these deter173. COMAR 21.05.02.13A (1999); see also MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 13103(e) (1) (1995 & Supp. 1999).
174. COMAR 21.01.02.01(77).
175. See Covington Machine & Welding Co., 5 MSBCA'I 436, at 7 (1998).
176. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §§ 16-101 to -203 (providing for suspension and debannent of contractors).
177. In accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act, see COMAR 21.10.07.01
to .09, the MSBCA "will not disturb the procurement officer's detennination
regarding responsibility unless the detennination was arbitrary, capricious, or
clearly erroneous." Covington Machine & Welding Co., 5 MSBCA at 5.
178. The MSBCA is a statutorily-created body, having only the powers granted it by
statute. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §§ 15-205 to -212 (1995 & Supp .
.1999); COMAR 21.02.02.01 to .03. The MSBCA has retained its proper role,
perhaps due to the wise chainnanship and membership of Robert K. Harrison, III, whose deft allegiance to the State Finance and Procurement Article
and the Administrative Procedures Act has restrained the MSBCA. See MD.
CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §§ 15-201 to -214; -216; MD. CODE ANN., STATE
Govr. §§ 10-101 to -305.
179. 2 MSBCA 1: 193 (1988). In this decision, the Maryland Port Administration
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minations in the officer's capacity of carrying out duties delegated
by the secretary of the department. lso For this reason, the secretary
of the department, who serves at the pleasure of the governor, may
properly direct the procurement officer how to determine bidder
responsibility. By comparison, in the federal sector, such "command
influence" on the independent contracting officer might render the
contract award invalid. lSI This friction demonstrates that the lofty
goal, as set forth in section 11-201 (a) (3) of the Procurement Article
and COMAR 21.01.01.03F, of providing safeguards for maintaining a
state procurement system of quality and integrity sometimes yields
to a rougher form of justice when applied to particular facts.
The procurement officer's determination of bidder responsibility involves a forecast of the contractor's probable ability to perform
the contract and is a matter of judgment which is to be based on
fact and reached in good faith.IS2 The procurement officer should
consider information such as work experience and ability.ls3 Information concerning bidder responsibility may be submitted after bid

180.
181.

182.
183.

(MPA) issued an RFP for certain construction work with one of the RFP provisions requiring the contractor to perform 25% of the work itself. See id. at 23. The procurement officer conducted a pre-award survey meeting and questioned the low bidder, about what percentage of the work it would do itself.
See id. at 3. The low bidder relayed that it would only perform 14% of the
contract work. See id. The procurement officer recommended that the low
bidder not be awarded the contract. See id. The procurement officer then notified the low bidder it would not be awarded the contract. See id. at 6. Subsequent to the notification by the procurement officer, the low bidder sent a
second letter stating that it would do 26% of the contract work. See id. In addition, the low bidder requested a meeting with the Secretary of MDOT. See
id. Based on the Secretary's instructions, MPA awarded the contract to the low
bidder. See id. at 7. The second low bidder protested, claiming the Secretary
wrongfully influenced the procurement officer's independent judgment. See
id. at 8. The MSBCA held that "command influence" was not an issue because the procurement officer's decision had not been usurped by a higher
authority. See id. at 19. What happened, instead, was the procurement officer's
decision had been overruled by the Secretary, who was exercising his own authority. See id.
See id. at 19.
See generally 48 C.F.R § 1.602-2(b) (1999) ("Contracting officers shall . . .
[e]nsure that contractors receive impartial, fair, and equitable treatment.");
Joel P. Shedd, Principles of Authority on Contracting Officers in Administration of
Government Contracts, 5 PUB. CONT. LJ. 88, 110-11 (1972) (discussing the invalidity of a contracting officer's actions when coerced by a higher authority).
See Covington Machine & Welding Co., 5 MSBCA'I 436, at 5 (1998) (citing
Charles Center Properties, 3 MSBCA'I 297, at 8-9 (1992».
See id. at 5-6.
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opening. 184
In making a determination of responsibility, the procurement
officer may consider whether the bidder: (1) has been in a particular business for a certain number of years;185 (2) holds certain certifications;186 (3) provides an executed debarment affidavit with its
bid;'87 (4) has the appropriate or comparable experience to perform the work;188 (5) has performed poorly on past contracts with
the state;189 (6) has the required licenses to perform the work;l90
and (7) possesses the appropriate technical staffing. 191
Integrity is not the only factor relevant to a determination of
bidder responsibility. In James Julian, Inc.,'92 the second low bidder
claimed that the apparent low bidder's bid was "materially unbalanced"'93 and should be rejected as non-responsible. The second
low bidder argued that its bid should be accepted. '94 The procurement officer denied its protest. 195 The MSBCA decided that a procurement officer may reject an unbalanced bid on the basis of responsibility, but only if the bidder's capability to perform is
184. See id. at 7 (citing National Elevator Co., 2 MSBCA 'lI 114, at 4 (1985».
185. See Independent Testing Agency, Inc., 4 MSBCA , 369, at 8 (1994) (noting
that the experience of corporate officers could be considered in determining
the "time in business" requirement); Calloway'S Air Conditioning & Remodeling, 3 MSBCA'lI 202, at 4-5 (1989) (stating that a procurement officer may
consider the work experience of the company's officers and employees to establish the required minimum work or skill requirements of a company).
186. See Independent Testing Agency, 4 MSBCA at 8.
187. See DeBarros Constr. Corp., 3 MSBCA, 215, at 3 (1989) (declaring that lack
of certificates and affidavits have a bearing on bidder responsibility, not responsiveness) .
188. See Environmental Controls, Inc., 2 MSBCA 1 168, at 5 (1987) (stating that the
procurement officer may consider a corporate official's experience in making
a responsibility determination).
189. See id. at 6 (finding that the procurement officer's non-responsibility determination was warranted due to past poor performance of the bidder).
190. See Civic Center Cleaning Co., 2 MSBCA 1 169, at 7 (1988) (agreeing with the
DGS that where certain licenses are necessary, and the bidder does not have
them, the bidder can be deemed non-responsible).
191. See Maryland New Directions, Inc., 2 MSBCA 'I 179, at 1 (1988) ("Where the
services to be provided under the proposed contract are personal services ... ,
it is reasonable for evaluators to look at those employees who will perform
the service to help establish that the offeror meets the minimum qualifications for the responsibility determination.").
192. 3 MSBCA'lI 245 (1990).
193. Id.
194. See id. at 2.
195. See id. at 3.
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adversely affected by any advance payment by the State. 196
In Civic Center Cleaning CO.,197 the IFB required bidders to submit the appropriate licenses with their bids. 198 The apparent low
bidder did not submit copies of its licenses with its bid and a protester claimed that failure to include such licenses made the bid
nonresponsive. l99 The MSBCA concluded that the licenses were necessary to determine the capability of the bidder and constituted a
question of responsibility, not responsiveness. 2OO Because the licenses
were on file with the procuring agency, the procurement officer determined that the apparent low bidder was responsible and the
MSBCA agreed with that decision. 201
In contrast to responsibility, '''[r]esponsive' means a bid submitted in response to an invitation for bids that conforms in all material respects to the requirements contained in the invitation for
bids. "202 It should be further noted that: "a matter of responsibility
'cannot be made into a question of responsiveness by the terms of
the solicitation.' "203 Unlike bidder responsibility, bid responsiveness
must be determined as of bid opening and must be evaluated from
the face of the bid documents, "not from any information subsequently gathered in a verification process or through other extrinsic
evidence."204
The determination of bid responsiveness is left to agency discretion and is only overcome by a showing that the procuring
agency's decision is clearly erroneous. 20S The MSBCA is more defer196. See id. at 7.

197. 2 MSBCA t 169 (1988).
See id. at 2.
See id. at 7.

198.
199.
200.
201.

202.
203.

204.
205.

See id.
See id. at 7-8 (finding that the procurement officer acted within his discretion

in considering the licenses on file in making a determination of responsibility).
COMAR 21.01.02.01(78) (1999). See Covington Machine & Welding Co., 5
MSBCA t 436, at 7 (1998).
Cuuington Machine & Welding Co., 5 MSBCA at 7. (quoting National Elevator
Co., 2 MSBCA, 151, at 4 (1985»; accord Independent Testing Agency, Inc., 4
MSBCA t 369, at 9 (1994); Cam Constr. Co. of Md., 2 MSBCA t 195, at 9
(1988).
AEPCO, Inc., 5 MSBCA 1. 415, at 5 (1997) (citations omitted).
See A1tek Corp., 4 MSBCA t 337, at 5 (1993) (adding that the appellant has
the burden of demonstrating that the procurement officer's technical judgment is clearly erroneous); Packard Instrument Co., 2 MSBCA 1. 125, at 8
(1986) (concluding that the appellant did not show that the procurement office's determination was erroneous).
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ential to the procurement officer's determination of responsibility
than to his determination of legal responsiveness. Items that bear
upon bid responsiveness include whether: (1) the bidder acknowledged receipt of material amendments to the solicitation;206 (2) the
bid is ambiguous;207 (3) the bidder's bid bond contains material defects;208 (4) the bid was submitted in the appropriate envelope;209
(5) the bid was submitted with bid samples required by the IFB;210
(6) a product submitted as "an equal" to the IFB specifications
meets the enumerated characteristics set forth in the IFB;211 (7) the
bidder committed to a Minority Business Enterprise (MBE) goal;212
and (8) the requirement that the bid include the names of employees with certain certifications. 213
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated that,
"[mlen must turn square corners when they deal with the Government. "214 This remains basically true today. Those vendors who wish
206. See Apex Environmental, Inc., 5 MSBCA'I 422, at 11 (1997) ("A bidder's failure to acknowledge receipt of a material amendment renders its bid
nonresponsive." (citing Oaklawn Dev't Corp., 2 MSBCA'I 138 (1986»).
207. See Porter Constr. Mgmt., Inc., 5 MSBCA , 414, at 4 (1997) (holding that an
ambiguous bid must be rejected as nonresponsive).
208. See Keller Bros./ Accubid Excavation Joint Venture, 5 MSBCA 'I 395, at 4
(1996) (rejecting the appellant'S bid as nonresponsive because the bid bond
provided did not contain the substantive requirements of the agency bid
bond form); Cornn & Gatch, Inc., I MSBCA'I 240, at 4 (1990) (upholding
the procurement officer's decision to reject the appellant'S bid as nonresponsive because the bid bond did not contain the penal sum amount); see also
MD. CODE ANN .. STATE FIN. & !'ROC. § 13-207 (1995 & Supp. 1999).
209. See Civic Center Cleaning Co., 2 MSBCA 'I 169, at 7 (1988) (holding that
deviation from the requirement that bids be submitted in preprinted blue envelopes was a matter of responsiveness, but the deviation was waived as a minor irregularity pursuant to COMAR 21.05.02.12A and 21.06.02.03).
210. See Merjo Adver. & Sales Promotion Co., 5 MSBCA, 393, at 4 (1996) (holding
that samples must be submitted with the bid, because "information . . .
outside the bid may not be considered" in determining whether a bid is responsive); see also H.L. Frey Corp., 5 MSBCA, 435, at 4 (1998).
211. See Rockville Partitions, Inc., 4 MSBCA, 367, at 3 (1994); see also Automated
Telecomm., Inc., I MSBCA , 219, at 6-8 (1989) (clarifying the brand name
"or equal" requirement).
212. See Gladwynne Constr. Co., 5 MSBCA, 390, at 3 (1996) (concluding that failure to commit to the proper MBE goal is not waivable as a "minor irregularity"); see also MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 14-301 (1995 & Supp. 1999).
213. See Substation Test Co., 5 MSBCA, 429, at 1 (1997) (holding that a low bidder that did not provide its employees' certifications had failed to comply
with a material requirement of the solicitation).
214. Rock Island, Ark. & La. R.R. Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920).
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to be awarded contracts must "turn square corners" in the sense
that the bid must strictly conform to the material requirements.
The term material is slightly flexible. 215 It would be impossible for
the State to codify, in advance, every single type of non-conformity
that would be deemed material. Under the common-law tradition,
the broad concept of responsiveness is applied to various factual situations. As a practical matter, whatever the MSBCA says is material
is material and not otherwise.
7.

Mistakes in Bids

Occasionally, there are mistakes in a bid submitted to the State.
Maryland procurement law has a low tolerance for mistakes in bids.
COMAR identifies the rules to follow when there are mistakes in a
bid. 216 For instance, if a bidder discovers a mistake in its bid prior
to bid opening, it may withdraw or correct the bid.217 If a mistake is
discovered after award of the contract, correction of the bid is not
permitted unless the procurement officer and the agency head determine that it would be unconscionable not to allow the mistake to
be corrected. 218 Even so, changes in bid price are not allowed. 219
Consistent with the rough form of justice noticeable in procurement practice, there is a good reason that a party who submits
a mistake in its bid will seldomly be excused. From some abstract
point of view, when an offeror offers to perform work, the offeree-the State-should have the power of acceptance. This notion, however, yields to the equitable belief that the offeree should
not be allowed to snap up an improvident offer.220
In the procurement law arena, state officials face difficulties
when a mistakenly low bid is accepted and the contractor fails to
perform because of the unfortunately low price. The government
may end up terminating the contractor for default and incur excess
procurement costs to hire a follow-on contractor unless a surety performs the work. Likewise, the reasonable bidder who offered the
second lowest bid price is hardly benefitted by watching one of his
imprudent competitors go bankrupt. It is usually better if the con215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

For a discussion of materiality, see supra notes 107-18 and accompanying text.
See COMAR 21.05.02.12 (1999).
See id. 21.05.02. 12B.
See id. 21.05.02. 12D.
See id.
See Mayor of Baltimore v. DeLuca-Davis Constr. Co., 210 Md. 518, 527, 124
A.2d 557, 562 (1956) (recognizing that when an offeror accepts a bid fully
aware that it is a mistake, it cannot hold the offeree to a binding contract).
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tract is awarded to the second lowest bidder, and the low bidder's
improvident offer merely withdrawn. State agencies should guard
against the practice of submitting a deliberately low bid, with the
unscrupulous bidder reckoning he can claim mistake if, upon disclosure of the other bids, he concludes his bid was too low. Eventually, such a bidder should be subject to a determination of nonresponsibility or perhaps even debarment in extreme cases. 221
The procurement regulations allow the procurement officer to
request a bid confirmation from a bidder if the procurement officer
knows or has reason to believe that a mistake in a bid has occurred. 222 The procurement officer should request confirmation of a
bid when the bid includes obvious errors or a bid is "unreasonably
lower" than other bids. 223 If, after confirmation is requested, a bidder alleges a mistake in its bid, the bidder may be allowed to withdraw the bid under certain circumstarJces. 224
Even if a mistake in a bid occurs, the mistake may be waived by
the procurement officer if the mistake constitutes a "minor irregularity. "225 Under Maryland procurement law:
A minor irregularity is one which is merely a matter of
form and not of substarJce or pertains to some immaterial
or inconsequential defect or variation in a bid or proposal
from the exact requirement of the solicitation, the correction or waiver of which would not be prejudicial to other
bidders or offerors. 226
A defect is immaterial "when its significance as to price, quantity,
quality, or delivery is trivial or negligible when contrasted with the
221. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 16-101 (1995 & Supp. 1999).
222. See COMAR 21.05.02.12C (listing situations where confinnation should be requested, including "obvious, apparent errors on the face of the bid or a bid
unreasonably lower than the other bids submitted").
223. Id. 21.05.02. 12C.
224. A bid may not be withdrawn after bid opening if the "mistake and intended
correction are clearly evident on the face of the bid document." Id.
21.05.02.12C(I). In this case, the bid shall be corrected. See id. On the other
hand, a bidder may withdraw its bid after bid opening if "(a) [a] mistake is
clearly evident on the face of the bid document but the intended correct bid
is not similarly evident; or (b) [t]he bidder submits proof of evidential value
which clearly and convincingly demonstrates that a mistake was made." Id.
21.05.02.12(2).
225. Id. 21.05.02.12A.
226. Id. 21.06.02.04A.
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total cost or scope of the procurement. "227 When a minor irregularity is discovered, the bidder has the opportunity to cure the defect
or the procurement officer may waive the deficiency-whichever is
most advantageous to the State. 228
The MSBCA has considered several appeals concerning mistakes in bids and the waiver of minor irregularities. In Dick Corp.,229
the MTA issued an IFB for construction work on the Baltimore Harbor TunneI.23o The procurement officer discovered that the low bidder's line items totaled approximately $400,000 less than the total
amount that had been written in words at the bottom of the bid
document. 231 The MSBCA stated that the low bidder could not increase its bid by $400,000.232 While the mistake was readily apparent
from the face of the bid, the intended correction was not clearly apparent from examination of the bid documents.233 It was only
through extrinsic evidence that the correct bid amount became
known.234 This ruling correctly recognized that if bidders could rely
on extrinsic evidence, such as an estimator's worksheets, to justify
changes in bids after the other prices are revealed, this might lead
to harmful practices and decreased public confidence in the state
procurement process.
Likewise, in Madigan Construction CO.,235 the bidder submitted a
bid bond that designated an improper obligee and provided that
the bid could be extended without notice to the surety for only
sixty days, whereas the IFB required ninety days.236 The appellant argued that the mistake was apparent, the result of a clerical error,
and that it should be allowed to correct the deficiency.237 The appellant also argued that the mistake was a minor irregularity that could
be waived by the procurement officer. 238
The MSBCA indicated that, pursuant to COMAR 21.05.02.12, to
justify the correction of a bid, both the mistake and the intended
227. Id. 21.06.02.04B; see MD. CODE
1999) .
228. See COMAR 21.06.02.04C.
229. 2 MSBCA'I 152 (1987).
230. See id. at 1.
231. See id. at 2.
232. See id. at 7.
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. 2 MSBCA'lI 162 (1987).
236. See id. at 1.
237. See id. at 2.
238. See id.

ANN.,

STATE
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&
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§ 11-101 (1995 & Supp.
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correction must be apparent on the face of the bid document. 239
The mistake was not apparent on the face of the form submitted
nor was the appropriate correction readily apparent. 240 The bid
bond, as submitted, fell short of the requirements. Therefore, the
MSBCA concluded the procurement officer could not bind the parties to promises beyond those expressed in the faulty bid bond. 241
The mistakes were not minor irregularities because the mistakes in
the bid bond were substantive.242
In P. Flanigan & Sons, Inc.,243 the Maryland Aviation Administration issued an IFB for certain construction work at BaltimoreWashington International Airport. 244 The IFB required a bid price
for temporary construction items that was not to exceed 3% of the
total bid price. 245 The low bidder exceeded the 3% cap by $125,695
on its $5,000,000 bid. 246 The procurement officer determined that
the deviation from the 3 % cap was a minor irregularity which could
be waived. 247
The MSBCA determined that a minor irregularity is not confined to those situations where the deviation is de minimis, but
when the deviation is trivial when compared to the total cost of the
procurement. 248 Here, the MSBCA determined that the low bidder
did not change or unbalance its total bid by not complying with the
3% cap. The $125,695 minimally affected-ironically, to the State's
benefit-the value of initial progress payments without putting
other bidders at an unfair competitive advantage. 249 As a result, the
deviation was trivial and could be waived by the procurement
officer.25o

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

See
See
See
See

id. at 3.

id.
id. at 4.
id.

5 MSBCA 1: 461 (1999).
See id. at 1.
See id. at 2.
See id. at 5-6.
See id. at 4.
See id. at 11.
See id. at 12-13 (concluding that the procurement officer did not err in finding that the deviation in the bid was trivial or that waiver would be prejudicial
to other bidders).
250. See id. at 11.
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Contract Award

Once the procuring agency makes a determination as to the responsible and responsive bidder who has submitted the lowest bid
price or lowest evaluated bid price on a procurement, it is within
the discretion of the BPW to award the contract. 251 Composed of
the Governor, the Comptroller of the Treasury, and the Treasurer,252 the BPW exercises its discretion to approve the actual
award of State of Maryland contracts.253
If the apparent awardee recognizes any political opposition to
the award, it is prudent, at least, to attend the BPW meeting where
the contract award is on the BPW agenda. Even though protests officially belong in the MSBCA forum, it is not unusual for the BPW
to be involved. For some agencies, such as the State Highway Administration, contract awards are made without the BPW.254 For the
others, BPW approval is required. 255 The BPW can direct award of a
contract,256 whereas the MSBCA merely determines whether the
award was lawful. 257
B.

Competitive Sealed Proposals

Competitive sealed proposals are used for procurement of a
"human, social, cultural, or educational service."258 Most of the contracts awarded by the federal government are awarded in accordance with the competitive sealed proposal method, where the
price is not the sole criterion for selection. In Maryland, however,
the use of RFPs is considerably more restricted. The reason for this
may reflect a preference, on the part of procurement officers, to
251. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 12-107 (1995 & Supp. 1999); see also
Kennedy Temps. v. Comptroller of Treasury, 57 Md. App. 22, 468 A.2d 1026
(1984).
252. See CaNsT. OF MD., DECL. RTS., art. XII, § 1.
253. See COMAR 21.02.01.05A (1999); see also Substation Test Co., 5 MSBCA 1 429,
at 10 (1997).
254. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 12-101(a) (1995 & Supp. 1999).
255. See id. § 12-101; COMAR 21.02.01.05A; see also Substation Test Co., 5 MSBCA at
10 (noting that only the BPW, not the MSBCA, has the authority to direct an
agency to award a contract).
256. Disappointed bidders have occasionally derailed recommendations of contract
award by attendance at the BPW meetings. Rarely, if ever, does the potential
awardee need to attend the BPW meetings in order to assure contract award.
More rare are the times that such attendance at the BPW meetings harms a
potential awardee.
257. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 12-203.
258. See id. § 13-102(b)(l) (Supp. 1999).
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minimize the opportunity for abuse and unfounded CrItIcIsm.
Mostly, the Maryland State personnel system motivates procurement
staffers to avoid "boss disapproval" and judgmental evaluations of
technical quality that are fairly vulnerable to bid protests.
The criteria in RFPs for selection of a contractor can be somewhat subjective. 259 It is a difficult proposition for the evaluation
committee or the procurement officer to select the single vendor to
provide the services for several years when often the only parties
competing are nearly similarly skilled to perform the work. In such
instances, the selection criteria may indicate the technical proposal
will count more heavily than price; however, the technical scores
are somewhat likely to be nearly equal so that price eventually becomes the differentiating factor. As one federal procurement
scholar put it: "No contracting officer ever got in trouble for awarding a contract to the low price offeror. "260
Award based on creativity in the technical proposal may be vulnerable to undue political pressure. It is understandable, but unfortunate, that the State puts excessive emphasis on low price in situations where the technical proposal should count much more. In
some areas, changing technology makes low prices in the evaluation
phase relatively unimportant in the performance over a long duration, and new technologies may replace earlier solutions. Procurement should be based on proposals that contemplate, rather than
eschew, such changes. Although awards based on so-called subjective criteria seem vulnerable to improper influence, Maryland has
opted to use low bid for procurement of some services that could
have, and perhaps should have, been procured based on competitive sealed proposals to avoid any potential for improper influence.
In Maryland, the history of abuse in the procurement arena,
most notably the famous example of Spiro Agnew's selection of architect/ engineer contractors based on willingness to provide kickbacks,261 has prompted procurement officers to rely excessively on
259. For example, subjectivity may creep into the procurement process when factors, such as, creativity and experience by the offeror in similar projects are
considered. See COMAR 21.05.03.0IB(I) (1999) ("[S]pecifications cannot be
prepared that would permit an award based solely on price."); MD. CODE
ANN .. STATE FIN. & PROC. § 13-104(b) (2) (providing that requests for proposals
shall include a statement of the factors that will be used in evaluating proposals and the relative importance of each factor).
260. Conversation of Scott A. Livingston and Donald A. Tobin of Bastianelli, Brown
& Kelly, on Nov. 10, 1993 (notes on file with the author).
261. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
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price as a criterion for selection. For example, in the on-line computer games contract awarded December 6, 1995, the lottery director indicated the selection was based on low price because lottery
services were regarded as a commodity that was not "rocket science;"262 however, the other thirty-one states in the country used
competitive sealed proposals for the selection of such contractors. 263
In other states, technical proposals for certain technology-based industries are weighted much more heavily than price because inn ovativeness is important. In Maryland, vulnerability to improper political influence hinders procurement properly disconnected from
pure cost considerations.
1.

Solicitations

Each RFP issued by the State must include general information
relating to the submission of proposals. 264 The award of contracts
pursuant to an RFP is based on more than price, so RFPs must include all the evaluation factors to be considered and the relative importance of each evaluation factor. 265 The State gives public notice
of RFPs in the same manner as notice for IFBs.266 Pre-proposal
meetings may take place in the same manner as pre-bid meetings267
and amendments to RFPs are made in the same manner as amendments to IFBs.268
With the advent of more technology contracts awarded by the
State, the determination of responsibility in response to an IFB may
be blurred with the determination of qualifications for the award of
a contract in response to an RFP. In an RFP where the government
requires certain technical disciplines, a team of proposers may be
offered to satisfy all of the different requirements. To be minimally
compliant, the offeror must have the several disciplines noted in
the technical section of a RFP. Each of those members must likewise
be a responsible party-one that has not been found lacking, for
example, in integrity. This becomes important where offerors, and
bidders, as a team, select partners or colleagues to participate in the
262. Lloyd Jones, statement at a Board of Public Works Meeting (Dec. 6, 1997).
263. See id.
264. See COMAR 21.05.03.02A(1) (listing that information that should be included
in a request includes the ~date, time, and place for the receipt of the proposals") .
265. See id. 21.05.03.02A(2).
266. See id. 21.05.03.02B; see also supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
267. See COMAR 21.05.03.02D.
268. See id. 21.05.03.02E.
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potential opportunity. The team manager should make sure that all
members of the team satisfy the minimum legal and ethical requirements for award of a contract because sooner or later the procurement officer will make sure they do, sometimes at the behest of a
potential bid protestor.
2.

Evaluation Criteria

The State must tell potential offerors, in detail, what goods and
services it needs and how it, as the customer, will decide what to
buy. Generally, an RFP must inform offerors of the evaluation criteria, including the scoring scheme that the agency intends to use to
evaluate the proposals. 269 It must give reasonably definitive information as to the relative importance of the factors to be used in the
evaluation. 27o This disclosure to offerors is necessary to ensure fair
and equal competition among the offerors. 271 Any sub-factors that
are used, however, "need not be disclosed so long as they merely
are definitive of the principal evaluation factors listed in the RFP."272
Undisclosed sub-factors, perhaps inchoate in the evaluator's mind,
hardly solidify the confidence and expectation of fair play of the offeror. In any event, award of a contract is then made to the responsible offeror whose proposal offers the greatest advantage to the
State. 273
In Fujitsu Business Communications SYStems,274 the RFP called for
furnishing, installing, and maintaining a routing system for telephone calls.275 The RFP contained evaluation criteria and provided
that the technical score would be sixty percent of the overall score,
and price would be forty percent of the overall score. 276 The
MSBCA decided that, in evaluating the proposal, the procuring
agency wrongfully evaluated the proposals based on a criterion unstated in the RFP.277 Agencies must adhere to the evaluation criteria
269. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 13-104(b) (1995 & Supp. 1999).
270. See, e.g., A&R/Bowie Ltd. Partnership, 4 MSBCA , 316, at 11 (1992) (citing
United Tech. Corp. & Bell Helicopter, Textron, 3 MSBCA , 201, at 35
(1989».
271. See Fujitsu Business Communication Sys., 4 MSBCA, 334, at 31 (1993) (citing
Mid-Atlantic Vision Servo Plan, Inc., 2 MSBCA, 173 (1988».
272. [d.
273. See id.
274. 4 MSBCA 1 334 (1993).
275. See id. at 2.
276. See id. at 31.
277. See id. at 3~32.
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listed in the RFP.278 The MSBCA further concluded that technical
scores were given in categories that were not susceptible of being
scored, such as giving points for providing basic information such as
the bidder's name, address, and Federal Communications Commission identification number.279 The MSBCA found that such scoring
bore no rational relationship to the truly technical items in the proposal and that the scoring of those items was arbitrary and capricious. 28o The MSBCA remanded to the agency to rescore in accordance with the evaluation factors contained within the RFP.281

3.

Discussions

The procuring agency may hold discussions with qualified offerors to assure full understanding of the agency's requirements, ascertain the offerors' abilities to perform, obtain the best price for the
state, and arrive at a contract price that is the most advantageous to
the State. 282 If the procuring agency conducts discussions "with one
offeror, it must do so with all offerors who have submitted [acceptable] proposals" or proposals that are "susceptible of being made
acceptable."283 For an offeror who submits a proposal that is susceptible of being made acceptable, the offeror must be given a meaningful opportunity in discussions to amend its proposal so as to
make it acceptable. 284
If the State can reasonably avoid decreasing the field of competition, it should do so. The officials who conduct such discussions
are prohibited from "coaching" other offerors by disclosing any information derived from another offeror's proposal, except for
"price and information related directly to price."285 Otherwise, an
offeror would be disinclined to propose any creative or original solutions to state problems.
4.

Bias

The procuring agency must evaluate proposals in an unbiased
manner so as to give each offeror a fair and equal opportunity to
See id.; see Nutrition Management Servs. Co., 4 MSBCA 1 363, at 9 (1994).
See Fujitsu Business Communication Sys., 4 MSBCA at 32.
See id.
See id. at 34.
See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 13-104(d) (1995 & Supp. 1999);
COMAR 21.05.03.03C(2)(a)-(c) (1999).
283. Fujitsu Business Communications Sys., 4 MSBCA at 33.
284. See id.
285. COMAR 21.05.03.03C(3) (a), (b) (ii).
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
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compete for a contract. 286 In making a claim of bias, the offeror
bears the heavy burden of proof to show that procurement agency
evaluators were biased.287 Indeed, the offeror must" 'offer virtually
irrefutable proof, not mere inference or supposition, that the
agency acted with a specific and malicious inten[t] to injure the [offeror].' "288 The authors have encountered numerous allegations,
but little evidence, of such malicious intent.
For various goods and services, the State has recurring needs;
in such situations, an incumbent vendor often seeks the follow-on
contract for the next several years. It is difficult for all of the offerors to be on a perfectly equal footing in these circumstances.
Incumbency has its advantages and disadvantages. An incumbent promising to perform for the follow-on period of time is
viewed, not surprisingly, through the lens of experience that the using agency has had with the incumbent. Procurement officers evaluating the proposal are entitled to consider past performance, especially the immediate performance, of the offeror when it promises
to perform everything satisfactorily, despite previous unfulfilled
promises. The circumstances also allow the incumbent to have access, on a daily basis, to people who are likely to be on the evaluation team. This gives an opportunity for bias in favor of the contractor if things are going well.
For the outsider, it is often difficult to know the extent, if any,
of the real advantages or disadvantages. Procurement officers tend
to go out of their way to assure outside competitors will have a fair
chance at awards. If the field of competition is tilted in favor of the
incumbent, few others will compete, and taxpayers will be harmed
in the long run. It may be noted that in 1997, a bill in the Maryland General Assembly was proposed to require consideration of
"past performance"289 and it was defeated. 290 The inference should
not be drawn that past performance is irrelevant merely because
this bill did not become law.
In Calso Communications, Inc.,29J DGS issued an RFP "for the
purchase, installation and maintenance of telephone and electronic
286. See Homecoming, Inc., 4 MSBCA , 309 (1992).
287. See id. at 11; Benton & Assoc., Docket Nos. MSBCA 2196 & 2201 (Nov. 1,
2000).
288. Id. (citations omitted).
289. This bill was House Bill 1282 of the 1997 General Assembly Session.
290. See id.
291. 2 MSBCA 'I 1377 (1988).
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key telephone systems for its facilities statewide. "292 The incumbent
vendor competed for the follow~n contract. 293 The four members
of the evaluation panel had all, at some point, expressed dissatisfaction with the incumbent, and DGS selected a new vendor. 294 In the
protest appeal, the MSBCA determined that the incumbent vendor
must prove "that the agency acted with a specific and malicious intent to injure the [incumbentJ."295 The MSBCA established a daunting standard because, even if there were actual bias, the agency's
decision "will be upheld unless such bias is clearly shown to have
permeated the decision. "296 Here, the evaluators had simply expressed dissatisfaction with the past performance. 297 The incumbent
failed to prove that the only reason for the selection of the evaluators, however, by the agency was its dissatisfaction with the incumbent. 298 As a result, the selection of the evaluators had a rational basis and could not be said to have been based on improper
motives. 299

5.

Evaluation on a Point System is Not Required

Pursuant to COMAR 21.05.03.03A(4), evaluating proposals using a numerical rating system is not required. Even when numerical
rating systems are used in the evaluation of proposals, the numerical ratings are used as mere guidelines in the selection of an offeror
whose proposal is the most advantageous to the State. 3OO
The MSBCA has recognized that the proposal evaluation process is inherently subjective and even the use of numerical rating
systems cannot make the process absolutely objective. 3Dl In evaluating proposals, more than price is considered, and the evaluators
must determine which proposal, overall, will be the most advantageous to the State. Point systems seem unnecessary where the pur- .
pose of the procurement is to award the contract based on factors
that are immeasurable by mathematical calculations.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

Id. at 2.
See id. at 5-8.
See id.
Id. at 10.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 10-11.
See id. at 11.
See Triad Management Sys., Inc. & Comprehensive Tech., Inc., 4 MSSCA ,.
378, at 12 (1995).
301. See id.
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Economic Benefits to Maryland

The procurement process may be used to achieve economic development, akin to the use of procurement to achieve socioeconomic goals. 302 In 1996, the procurement regulations were
amended so that procuring agencies would include, "'an economicbenefits' factor as one of several technical factors to be evaluated in
determining which offeror's proposal is the most advantageous to
the State. "303 The purpose of the economic benefits factor is to encourage offerors "to be innovative in developing their proposals
and to demonstrate how awarding the contract to them will provide
economic benefits to the State of Maryland. "304
To illustrate, in one RFP, the State required offerors to submit·
a narrative describing the benefits that would accrue to the Maryland economy as a direct or indirect result of the offeror's performance on the contract. 305 The items considered were: "[i]temized and
total contract expenditures . . . used for Maryland subcontractors,
suppliers, and joint venture partners, "306 the "number and types of
jobs for Maryland residents,"307 "[ihemized and total tax revenues
. . . to be generated for Maryland and its political subdivisions,"308
"[i] temized and total contract expenditures . . . committed to Maryland small businesses and MBEs, "309 and any "[0] ther benefits to
the Maryland economy which the offeror promises will result from
302. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 14-301 (1995 & Supp. 1999).
303. BPW Advisory Opinion No. P-004-96, Using Economic-Benefits as a Factfff in Evaluating Competitive Sealed Proposals, at 1 (1996); COMAR 21.05.03.03A(3) (1999).
The Procurement Advisory Council and its principal staff, the Governor's Procurement Advisory Council, provide another source for procurement policy
and good management. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §§ 12-102, -105.
304. BPW Advisory opinion No. P-004-96, at 1.
305. See DEPT. OF TRANS., MVA ADMIN., VEHICLE EMISSIONS INSPECTION PROGRAM, So.
UCITATION REFERENCE No. V-HQ99-111-S § IV.E, at 51 (Apr. 13, 1999) (hereinafter "YElP").
306. See id.; see also COMAR 21.05.03.03A(3) (i) (listing an economic benefits factor
as "[t]he offeror's intended procurement from Maryland subcontractors, suppliers, and joint venture partners").
307. See VEIP, Section IV.E at p. 51; see also COMAR 21.05.0303A(3) (ii) (listing an
economic benefits factor as "[ t] he number of jobs generated for Maryland residents").
308. See VEIP, Section IV.E at p. 51; see also COMAR 21.05.0303A(3) (iii) (listing an
economic benefits factor as " [tlax revenues generated to Maryland and its political sUbdivisions").
309. See VEIP, Section IV.E at p. 51; see also COMAR 21.05.0303A(3) (iv) (listing an
economic benefits factor as "[t]he amount or percentage of subcontract dollars placed with Maryland smail businesses and Maryland MBEs").
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awarding the contract to the offeror. "310 Such an economic benefits
factor can be critized because it leaves unclear whether an offeror
will lose points, for example, if it pays fewer taxes due to a lower
price, as compared with a less efficient offeror whose higher labor
costs presumably generate greater payroll taxes for the benefit of
the State of Maryland.
The economic benefits factor has various conditions on its use.
It is only to be used for proposals for contracts that may be reasonably expected to exceed $25,000.311 The economic benefits factor supposedly should not be interpreted as a preference for resident offerors. The purpose of the economic benefits factor is not to award
contracts to Maryland offerors, but to any offerors who will provide
certain economic benefits to Maryland through the performance of
the contract. Indeed, Maryland procurement law does not provide
for preferences, only reciprocal preferences. 312
The substantial economic benefits factor has been subject to
some criticism. Regardless of the awardee, most of the work, such as
construction projects, inspection services, and vehicle emission inspection services, is often done by people living in Maryland. It is
quite unlikely that any party could have a significantly greater economic benefit for the State than any other party. It may become relevant, however, where a bulk of the work can be done outside the
state. For example, in the Y2K compliance project, some vendors
hired software engineers from India to perform the programming
work furnished to the State as part of the compliance work. Taxpayers would benefit because, presumably, the relatively lower costs due
to performance out of the country were reflected in the lower bid
price. Likewise, Maryland contractors competing for contracts in
other states would not appreciate such a factor used against them
when competing for non-Maryland contracts.

310. See VEIP, Section W.E at p. 51; see also COMAR 21.05.0303A(c) (providing that
offerors may receive "up to half the total allocable technical points under an
economic-benefits evaluation factor for other elements directly or indirectly
attributable to the contract that contribute to the Maryland economy").
311. See BPW Advisory Opinion No. P-004-96, Using Economic Benefits as a Fador in
Evaluating Competitive Sealed Proposals, at 1 (1996).
312. See MD. CODE ANN .. STATE FIN. & PROC. § 14401 (1995 & Supp. 1999); COMAR
21.05.01.04.
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IV. BID PROTESTS

A.

Pre-Opening Bid Protests

The bid protest is a creature of government procurement. In
the private commercial sector, it is exceedingly unlikely that a vendor would challenge the sovereignty of the customer in deciding
which vendor to whom to award a contract. There are more successful ways of marketing than suing potential customers; often vendors
have little choice but to assert their lawful rights to fair treatment.
In the public sector, laws obligate the procurement officer to treat
the vendors in a fair manner, and vendors should feel comfortable
protecting their rights. Retaliation from procurement officers seems
a remote possibility. Procurement officers tend to be professionals
who are less concerned with selecting a particular awardee and
more concerned with fashioning a system of procurement integrity.
The government induces vendors to compete for contracts in consideration for the government's promise, implied or otherwise, to
fairly evaluate the proposals. 313 A challenge to formation of a contract or the sufficiency of the solicitation seldom, in the authors'
view, offends the professional procurement officer.
The bid protest, as a legal action, lies at the heart of the procurement process. It is in this forum where the community of interested parties can best express its reasons why, as a matter of fair
play, a solicitation is unduly restrictive or a contract should be
formed with a particular party. Although the procedures were designed to be simple, bid protests have developed into sophisticated
litigation, akin to the most demanding trials in circuit courts.
The bid protest procedure generally proceeds through the following steps. Prior to and after the submission of the offer, an aggrieved party may file a bid protest with the procuring agency challenging some aspect of the procurement. 314 A bid protest is a
313. For this reason, if the procurement officer fails to consider the proposal fairly,
the usual remedy for the bidder is compensation for its bid preparation costs.
The disappointed bidder seldom recovers contract damages measured by the
amount of profit it would have earned but for the contracting procurement
officer's misconduct for one reason: there never was a contract awarded to
the bidder. Breach damages measured by lost profits, therefore, seldom seem
appropriate, except in civil rights cases such as those based on 42 U.S.C.
§1983.
314. See MD. CODE ANN .. STATE FIN. & PROC. § 15-215 (1995 & Supp. 1999); COMAR
21.10.02.0IB(3), .02A, .03.
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written complaint filed by an interested party315 addressed to the
procurement officer. 316 Bid protests based on alleged improprieties
in the solicitation that are apparent prior to bid opening must be
filed prior to bid opening. 317 For protests challenging the appropriateness of contract formation, the deadline is seven days from when
the protester knew or should have known of the basis for the protest. 318
The MSBCA strictly construes this timeliness requirement as being substar!tive in nature and not susceptible to waiver.319 Any untimely protest "necessarily prejudices the rights and interest of the
low bidder, the contracting agency and perhaps other interested
parties. "320 Failure to raise a timely protest results "in the individual interest of the offeror being outweighed by the public interest
involved in assuring that [s]tate procurement proceed without de- .
lay. "321 Practitioners looking to secure the rights of a bidder are advised that the Office of the Attorney General, who defends the state
in such bid protests, aggressively defends against bid protests on
grounds of untimeliness.
315. See id. 21.10.02.01B(1) (defining "interested party" as "an actual or prospective
bidder, offeror, or contractor that may be aggrieved by the solicitation or
award of a contract, or by the protest").
316. See id. 21.10.02.02A.
317. See id. 21.10.02.03A; see also, e.g., State Highway Admin. v. Bramble, 351 Md.
226, 228 n.l, 717 A.2d 943, 94344 n.l (1998) (noting that the MSBCA has
held that a contractor is required to inquire about any perceived discrepancies prior to bid); Century Elevator, Inc., 5 MSBCA, 466, at 6 (1999) (concluding that it is "too late" to protest bid criteria after bid opening); American Sanitary Prods., Inc., 5 MSBCA, 455, at 4 (1999) (restating that a protest
is required to be filed prior to bid opening); J&J Reprod. & Drafting Supplies, Inc., 5 MSBCA 'I 409, at 3 (1996) (concluding a bid protest was untimely under COMAR 21.10.02.03); Bruce D. Royster, 5 MSBCA , 406, at 6
n.l (1996) (concluding that the MSBCA had no jurisdiction because the appellant did not file a timely bid protest).
318. See COMAR 21.1O.02.03B.
319. See FMB Laundry Corp., 5 MSBCA, 467, at 5 (1999). Indeed, failure by bidders to protest timely divests the MSBCA of subject matter jurisdiction to hear
an appeal from the final decision of the procurement officer. See JCV, Inc., 5
MSBCA, 445, at 3 (1998). Likewise, failure to file a timely claim divests the
MSBCA of subject matter jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the final decision of the procurement officer. See Cherry Hill Constr., Inc., 5 MSBCA , 459,
at 16 (1999).
320. FMB Laundry Carp., 5 MSBCA, at 5.
321. Wilbanks Tech. Corp., 5 MSBCA , 440, at 3 (1998) (citing Rolm Mid-Atl., 1
MSBCA 'I 35, at 6 (1983»; see also ]&] &prod. & Drafting Supplies, Inc., 5
MSBCA at 3.
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In Merjo Advertising & Sales Promotions CO.,322 the DGS issued an
IFB for the purchase of three types of signs for use by the lottery.
The IFB provided that the vendor should be "capable and
equipped to produce this project entirely within [its] own facilities. "323 Mter bid opening, a disappointed bidder filed a protest
and claimed that the requirement that signs be manufactured "entirely" within the vendor's facilities could not be complied with if
the IFB were read literally.324 The MSBCA decided that, because
the IFB clearly stated the requirement that the bidder had to make
the signs entirely within its own facilities, " [a]ny objection [the disappointed bidder] had concerning the reasonableness of this requirement or its meaning was required to be filed before bid opening."325 The disappointed bidder did not file a protest prior to bid
opening, so the MSBCA dismissed the protest as untimely.326
As is evident from numerous bid protest appeals, the MSBCA
aims to minimize any disruption to the procurement process.
Where a procurement officer's decision is not unreasonable, it will
be upheld as consistent with the standards of review established by
the APA. 327 Where a bidder arguably misses the deadline for filing
an appeal to the MSBCA, the MSBCA looks hard to avoid any controversial expansion of its jurisdiction.
This strictness, which seems illiberal to the disappointed vendor, may be a necessary evil in the system. The jurisdiction of the
MSBCA is clearly established by the Maryland General Assembly,
and any tardiness in filing a bid protest is readily deemed fatal. The
MSBCA uses this notion to carefully distinguish between those improprieties in the formation of a contract versus those improprieties
in the application of proper specifications. 328 If the gist of the bidder's complaint is that an improper specification was eventually applied unfavorably to the bidder, the MSBCA swiftly concludes that
the bidder failed to file his claim in a timely manner-prior to bid
opening.
Pre-opening bid protests concern specifications that improperly
favor a single prospective bidder or are otherwise unduly restric322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

5 MSBCA 1 396 (1996).
[d. at 2.
See id. at 3.
[d. at 4.
See id.
See MD. CODE ANN .. STATE GoV'T § 10-201 (1999 & Supp. 1999).
See generally Trane Co., 5 MSBCA 1 118, at 5 (1985) (denying a protest to

modification specifications because of untimeliness).
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tive. 329 In Siems Rental & Sales CO.,330 the DGS issued a specification
which required self-propelled lift platforms to be a width of thirtytwo inches with a one-inch margin of error. 331 The bidder argued
that the specification was unduly restrictive because only one platform made by one company met those specifications. If the DGS revised the specification to thirty-three inches with a one inch margin
of error, several platforms would be available to the DGS.332 A DGS
representative stated that the thirty-two inch specification was chosen simply as a result of looking at a sales flyer from a particular
vendor.333
The MSBCA concluded that a "procurement officer has broad
discretion in drafting specifications to meet the State's minimum requirements when weighed against the [s] tate policy of fostering the
maximum practical competition. "334 The MSBCA would not substitute its technical judgment for the procurement officer's judgment,
but would determine whether the specifications did "unreasonably
restrict competition contrary to Maryland procurement law. "335
The MSBCA determined that the DGS presented no facts that justified the strict measurements listed in the specification. 336 As a result, the MSBCA sustained the protest on the grounds that the specifications were unduly restrictive. 337 This opinion, consistent with
procurement policy, broadened the field of competition for the
benefit of the taxpayers. 338
329. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §13-205 (1995 & Supp. 1999); COMAR
21.04.01.02A (1999) (providing that specifications are written to permit "maximum practicable competition"); see also Xerox Corp., 1 MSBCA 1 48, at 6
(1983) (limiting the MSBCA's determinations regarding the drafting of specifications to a determination of whether the specifications "unreasonably restrict competition and cannot substitute its judgment as to technical requirements for that of the procuring agency").
330. 3 MSBCA 1 288 (1991).
331. See id. at 1-2.
332. See id. at 2.
333. See id.
334. [d. at 3.
335. [d. at 4 (citations omitted).
336. See id. at 4-5 (indicating that such facts could have included measurements of
doorways, space between parked buses, and areas in and around where the
lift was to be used).
337. See id. at 5.
338. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 11-201(a)(4) (1995 & Supp. 1999)
(indicating a purpose of the procurement law is to foster "effective broadbased competition in the State through support of the free enterprise system").
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Post-opening Bid Protests

As with pre-opening bid protests, the MSBCA lacks jurisdiction
to hear an untimely appeal from a procurement officer's final decision on a protest concerning formation of a contract. 339 All protests
must be filed within seven days of when the protestor knew or
should have known of the basis for the protest. 340 Assuming that a
protest is timely filed, the protester seldom will succeed in its protest unless a technical legal violation puts the apparent low bidder
at an unfair competitive advantage. The protestor most likely succeeds in its protest where the technical legal violation puts an opposing biddel' at a tangible competitive advantage.
In Daly Computers Inc.,341 the Department of Budget and Fiscal
Planning issued an IFB for computers, including a requirement that
all computers have Novell certification, a costly requirement. 342 The
State awarded the contract to the apparent low bidder even though
the low bidder's computers were not Novell-certified. 343 Noting that
bidders must be accorded fair and equitable treatment, the MSBCA
sustained this protest. The low bidder received an unfair competitive advantage by not spending the money necessary to have its
computers certified by Novell, as the protestor did. 344
In Midasco, Inc.,345 SHA solicited bids to furnish and install certain advanced traffic management equipment. Prior to bid opening,
the bidder notified an SHA project manager of a discrepancy in the
bid documents. The index of quantities listed an estimate of 430
linear feet of conduit, whereas the schedule of prices indicated
8,215 feet of conduit. The SHA project manager indicated it was
too late to postpone bid opening. 346 Bids were opened publicly. Mter bid opening, the procurement officer decided to reject all bids
and resolicit the project at a later date. 347
On this project, Midasco bid $.01 per linear foot for the conduit. The second low bidder bid $15.80 per linear foot. As a basis
for rejection of the bids, the procurement officer's subordinates expressed a concern that Midasco's bid was materially unbalanced. At
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

See MD. CODE ANN .. STATE FIN. & PROC. §15-217.
See COMAR 21.10.02.03B (1999).
4 MSBCA t 329 (1993).
See id. at 2.
See id. at 9.
See id. at 11-12.
Docket No. MSBCA 2209 (Jan. 31, 2001).
See Helmut Guenshcel, Inc., 3 MSBCA t 211, at 7 (1989).
See Midasco, Docket No. MSBCA 2209, at 5.
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the MSBCA hearing, the procurement officer testified that he did
not believe that Midasco's bid was materially unbalanced. Instead,
he testified that he was concerned that the discrepancy in quantity
could necessitate the use of the variations in estimated quantities
("VEQ") clause, which meant that Midasco's bid mayor may not result in the lowest ultimate cost to the State.
The low bidder's protest was denied, but on appeal the MSBCA
found in favor of the low bidder. 348 While acknowledging that the
decision to reject all bids is a discretionary determination by the
procurement officer, the MSBCA determined that the decision was
so "arbitrary and capricious as to constitute a breach of trust. "349
The MSBCA determined that SHA made four mistakes that
breached the trust. First, SHA showed the bid item incorrectly on
the schedule of prices. Second, the low bidder advised SHA of the
discrepancy and SHA failed to take timely action. Third, SHA accepted and publicly opened all bids knowing there was a question
with the bid. Finally, SHA failed to recognize the error had no
negative consequences to the bidders. Here, SHA failed to demonstrate that any bidder had an unfair advantage because all bidders
were on the same footing with respect to the mistake. The MSBCA
determined that a resolicitation after prices were revealed was not
in the State's best interest and was unfair to the low bidder.
V.

PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS

A.

MSBCA Jurisdiction

A protest must be filed with the procurement officer,35o and the
procurement officer must expeditiously issue a final decision either
sustaining or denying the protest. 351 It is only after the procurement
348. Unusually, this opinion resulted in a dissenting opinion, which is quite uncommon at the MSBCA. The MSBCA, by statute, consists of three members.
As of the date of the Midasco decision, only two members were sitting at the
MSBCA, with the third position having been vacant since approximately August 2000. Midasco was the first split decision of the two-member MSBCA. The
MSBCA members decided that the only fair way to resolve the split in the decision was to have the appellant prevail where one of the two MSBCA members found that the appellant's appeal should be sustained. See id. at 9, 10.
Even if this decision is overturned on appeal, the MSBCA's decision is instructive of how the
349. Id. at 8.
350. See COMAR 21.10.02.02 (1999) (providing that the protest must be in writing
and submitted to the procurement officer).
351. See id. 21.1O.02.09A ("A decision on a protest shall be made by the procure-
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officer's final decision that the matter may be appealed to the
MSBCA.352 The MSBCA is a statutorily-created body vested with finite jurisdiction to hear and decide appeals arising from final
agency action that pertains to bid protests and contract claims. 353
This means the procurement officer's action must be final. If there
is no final decision of the procurement officer, the MSBCA lacks
the jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 354

B. Effect of Filing Bid Protests
When a party files a timely bid protest prior to bid opening,
the time for submitting bids is supposed to be postponed. 355 A
party is entitled to an answer prior to bid opening, even if it means
postponing the date or time for receipt of bids. 356 A bidder need
not submit a timely bid to protect its interests once a timely bid
protest has been filed. 357
Ordinarily, contract award is postponed when a bid protest is
filed after bid opening and "the authority to award a contract has
not been delegated to a department pursuant to COMAR
21.02.01.04."358 There is one exception: the BPW may find that "execution of the contract without delay is necessary to protect substantial [s] tate interests. "359 If so, a contract award is proper in the face
of the protest. 360 "If the authority to award a contract has been delegated to a department pursuant to COMAR 21.02.01.04,"361 contract award is postponed until either the agency head determines
that "execution of the contract without delay is necessary to protect

352.
353.
354.

355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.

ment officer in writing 'as expeditiously as possible after receiving all relevant,
requested information.").
See id. 21.10.02.09C(3) (providing the criteria for an appeal to the MSBCA).
See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC.§ 15-211(a) (1995 & Supp. 1999).
See Hess Fence & Supply Co., 5 MSBCA'I 438, at 2 (1998) (concluding that
there was no jurisdiction because the appellant did not appeal from a final
agency determination). Once the MSBCA issues a final decision, the appellant
or the government may seek judicial review of the MSBCA's decision at the
circuit court level. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 15-223; Md. Rules
7-201 to -210.
See Helmut Guenschel, Inc., 3 MSBCA'I 211, at 7 (1989).
See id. at 7.
See id.
COMAR 21.10.02.11A (1999).
[d. 21.10.02.11A.
See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §10-204 (1995 & Supp. 1999); COMAR
21.10.02. 11 A.
COMAR 21.10.02.11B.
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the substantial [s] tate interests"362 or the MSBCA issues a final decision. 363 If the contract is to be executed prior to a final decision by
the MSBCA, the procuring agency must notify the MSBCA.364
Of the thousands of contract awards approved by the BPW annually, there are approximately thirty to fifty bid protests per year
appealed to the MSBCA. Of these, there are fewer than five annually where the BPW awards a contract in the face of the bid protest.
In a few instances per year, however, the BPW finds that substantial
state interests justify immediate award of the contract in the face of
a pending bid protest. In one case in 1994,365 the BPW entertained
approximately 500 pages of documents indicating why it was vital
that the award be made in spite of the pendency of the bid protest.
There is a good reason for the BPW to refrain from awarding
in the face of a bid protest. The MSBCA may sustain the appeal. If
so, the BPW's approval of the contract would have to be rescinded.
A bidder deserves a meaningful opportunity to be heard in a neutral forum prior to award. Otherwise, the prize for which the bidder
competed-the contract-is lost. An undeserving party may get the
benefit of procurement mischief.
When the MSBCA issues a decision on the bid protest, it creates a body of law for the subsequent disposition of future bid protests. Vendors and legal practitioners alike use this body of law to
understand and predict how the MSBCA would view certain arguments. This helps avoid future bid protests. The procurement community is better able to assess, in advance, the likelihood of success
thanks to the MSBCA's jurisprudence.
By contrast, in less sophisticated systems, such as the Board of
Estimates in Baltimore City, no body of law is developed. The result
is a lack of confidence in the integrity of the contract awards, which
seem to be amenable to the mercurial attitudes of officials who are
not guided by stare decisis.
Indeed, one of the main reasons for creating the MSBCA was
to develop such a body of law. 366 In contrast to arbitration, where
the reasons for the decisions are seldom spelled out and would not
be binding on subsequent parties, the MSBCA has, through diligent
and scholarly efforts, established a hefty body of law to guide the
362.
363.
364.
365.

[d. 21.10.02.11B(1).
See COMAR 21.10.02.1lB(2).
See id. . 1O.02.11A(2), .llB(2).
See Distance Learning Fiber Optic Contract, Issued by the Department of
Budget and Fiscal Planning (1994).
366. See Livingston, supra note 7, at 231.
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disposition of future disputes in bid protests. It is an element of the
modern procurement system that there is this "transparency" where
vendors can see what the rules are; or at least what rules have been
applied in the past.
VI. PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICAL POINTS
The public interest lays in proper application of the procurement laws, which depends on the parties' diligent effort to honor
procurement procedures for award and enforcement of contract
promises. In the words of the court of appeals in State v. Dashiell: 366
"[A] contractual obligation is binding on the conscience of the sovereign. "367 Beyond the moral rationale for such a remark, there are
strong practical reasons why parties, especially the State, should be
held strictly to obey its own rules and abide by its procurement contract promises. If the State is too readily excused from the procedural laws or a substantive promise, or is able to allocate too much
risk to a contract awardee, a contractor's eagerness to compete is diminished, higher prices for goods and services are the result.
In Stanbalt Associates v. State,368 the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland addressed a new risk for contractors. In this case, the Governor of Maryland signed a lease with Stanbalt Associates
("Stanbalt").369 Over the first eleven years of the lease term, the
Governor requested sufficient funds in his annual Budget Bill for
appropriation from the Maryland General Assembly to pay the
agreed-upon rent. 370 One year later, the Maryland General Assembly
reduced the amount of rent requested during the first year. The
Governor declined to request the agreed-upon rent amount in subsequent years.37I Stanbalt argued that the Governor erred in failing
to request a rent increase from the General Assembly.372 The court
of special appeals, in affirming the trial court's decision to dismiss
the case, characterized the proposed request for an increase in rent
by the Governor to be an "exercise in futility."373
In reaching its decision, the court rejected Stanbalt's argument
that implicit in the contract was an obligation on the Governor's
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.

195 Md. 677, 75 A.2d 348 (1950).
Id. at 692, 75 A.2d at 355.
No. 1628, slip op. (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Feb. 8, 2000).
See id. at 1.
See id.
See id. at 7.
See id.
See id. at 8.

1999]

Maryland Procurement Law

53

part to seek sufficient funds from the Maryland General Assembly.374
The decision of the court of special appeals presents a new risk for
contractors, namely that the executive department might not even
seek sufficient funds to pay a multi-year contract. 375 Historically,
contractors realized the risk of non-cooperation by the Maryland
General Assembly when it came to appropriations to pay for multiyear contracts. Suddenly, there is no longer an implied duty of
good faith on the part of the Governor to request sufficient funds
for contracts. This will likely discourage vigorous competition for
such contracts.
The State spends billions of dollars annually procuring goods
and services from contractors. The State induces these contractors
to compete for state contracts, and taxpayers benefit from such
competition because it maximizes the purchasing power of the
State. 376 Contractors who perceive that the State will disregard the
rules or decline to pay for services may not compete vigorously; the
result would be serious harm to the state procurement system.
Some bidders may inflate their bid prices in case the State
forces the bidder to file expensive protests to assure award. Other
bidders would rather run the risk of non-selection because they
might not be the low bidder, than run the risk that state officials
will dishonor the award procedures or contract terms after the contract. If, for instance, the bid prices drift upwards by 3% because
bidders slightly inflate their prices, the State would spend
$240,000,000 more annually for the purchase of such goods and services. If the State fairly treats contractors who inflated their bids,
the taxpayers will have spent more than necessary, and the contractor will experience a windfall.
Some contractors will not inflate their bids. They may assume it
is better to submit an offer and simply hope to minimize the risk
that the State will misapply the regulations governing award or will
not honor the terms of the contract. Distrust of the State may encourage contractors to take actions they would otherwise not take.
To make sure the State honors its bargain, some contractors might
seek to apply political influence to state officials for protection
against such contract problems. 377 These practices will undermine
374. See id.
375. See id.
376. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 11-201(a)(7) (1995 & Supp. 1999)
(listing the purposes and policies of general procurement law).
377. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.

54

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 29

the integrity of the procurement system and discourage competition
for state contracts. Again, this would generate an adverse effect on
taxpayers. 378
Some potential contractors will decide not to compete for Maryland contracts. These contractors may conclude it is better to allocate finite bidding resources towards opportunities with other government customers who treat contractors more fairly. For example,
the State is allowed to include an indemnification clause that requires contractors to assume unlimited liability on contracts. 379 Although such a provision may deter potential bidders, this is balanced against the need for the State to protect against the risk of
future liability for a contractor's negligence. 38o However, these provisions are perceived as excessively favorable to the State and do deter bidders. IBM declined to bid on the lucrative Network Services
Contract with the Department of Budget and Management because
of an indemnification clause that allocated excessive risk. 381 When a
contractor decides not to expend bidding resources to compete for
Maryland contracts, because of the State's reputation for being unfair, there is a harmful reduction in the field of competition that
harms taxpayers.
Procurement of goods and services is, and always has been,
necessary to accomplish state objectives. As long as procurement
practices are fair, contractors will compete vigorously. Among the
essential features of any fair system are rules that are chosen metaphorically by those who are "behind a veil of ignorance" about
their positions. 383 In an ideal situation, the rule makers would not
know if they would be bidders, procurement officers, or taxpayers
when the rules are applied. 384 Because all are similarly situated, no
one would design a system where happenstance overcomes rational378. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
379. See Op. Md. Att'y Gen. No. 819842, available in 1997 WL 97-029 at *2 (Dec. 23,
1997) (considering a provision in a procurement contract that provided that
the contractor was responsible for all damages resulting from its activities in
connection with the contract, and that the contractor shall indemnify the
State) .
380. See id. at *4-*5.
382. Conversation with Scott A. Livingston and Joseph Grossnickel, Vice President
of Maryland Regional Sales, IBM (Aug. 18, 1999) (notes on file with the author).
383. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (Harvard Univ. Press 1999) (explaining
that people would not know their places in society in a fair system).
385. See id.
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ity, or where certain parties are favored by the rules. 386 The goal of
each would be to strive towards fairness in the procurement process
as a whole.
VII. CONCLUSION
Since the enactment of the Maryland Procurement Article in
1980,387 great strides have been made towards a fair procurement
system. The procurement laws were implemented to foster vigorous
competition among bidders,388 to protect the State by ensuring that
services are provided in the most cost effective manner, to ensure
fairness, and to protect the public from corruption. 389 The statutory
and decisional body of law that governs procurement furthers these
purposes. 390
For competitive sealed bidding,391 all requests for bids must be
published,392 and all potential bidders must be informed of and encouraged to attend pre-bid meetings. 393 If the State materially
amends the bid, potential bidders must be notified,394 and bidders
may not be given unfair advantage by the procuring agency.395 At
the evaluation stage, bids are considered on the basis of objective
criteria396 and awarded to the responsible contractor with the responsive bid that has the lowest evaluated price. 397 The rules further
seek to protect both the State and bidders when a bidder makes a
mistake in a bid. 398
The same fairness requirements are in place for competitive
sealed proposals. 399 The award of these contracts is based on subjec386. See id. (opining that such a method would ensure that people are not advantaged or disadvantated because they would be able to design a system to
favor their positions).
387. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
388. See MD. CODE ANN .. STATE FIN. & PROC. §13-205 (a)(l) (1995 & Supp. 1999);
COMAR 21.04.01.02A (1999).
389. See supra notes 23-40, 72-80 and accompanying text.
390. See supra notes 41-71 and accompanying text.
391. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
392. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
393. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 104-24 and accompanying text.
395. See supra notes 125-60 and accompanying text.
396. See supra notes 161-72 and accompanying text
397. See supra notes 173-215 and accompanying text.
398. See supra notes 216-57 and accompanying text.
399. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.

56

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 29

tive criteria and not solely on price. 400 The proposal must include
the factors that will be considered in an award determination. 401 Potential bidders are informed of the evaluation criteria. 402 The award
of these contracts, like competitive sealed bidding, must be evaluated in a fair and unbiased fashion. 403
The statutory and administrative structure is additionally bolstered by an appeals process that serves the dual purposes of protecting the State's interests and treating all parties fairly. Bidders,
who believe they were unfairly denied the ability to bid on or be
awarded a contract, have an avenue of recourse by filing a pre- or
post-bid protest with the procurement officer.404 Mter the denial of
a protest by the procurement officer, a bidder may also file an appeal with the MSBCA.405 The MSBCA ensures that the goals of procurement are met and has the power to hear appeals that challenge
an award. 406 Changes to the procurement laws arise in reaction to
actions by government officials and potential bidders that go against
the spirit of fair procurement. 407 The common sense of the procurement rules and regulations fosters fairness in the procurement
system.
The overriding theme of fairness present in the State's procurement system must be balanced with the need to attract bidders
while not paying too much of the public treasury.408 Otherwise, the
system has fewer potential resources for goods and services and the
lowest possible price or best arrangement will not be produced. 409
Not even political pressures should disrupt this weighing, lest the attractiveness of the state contracts decrease and the taxpayers bear
the ultimate burden. 410 In short, the State bid protest procedure
supports the State's goals to generate value and to avoid mischief,
to act fairly and be perceived as acting fairly.411
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